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Japani

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Qka po thoj Analistat
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Njerez ne qet topic osht mir qe ata qe mujn me siguru mendime te analistave te ndryshem per qeshtjet aktuale mi postu ketu.


Ka shum njerez qe pritojn me kshyr TV(televizor se kam per tye) edhe me ble gazeta, e na qe mujna me ju ofru senet ketu osht mir qe mi ndihmu njerezit qe jan jasht kosoves edhe ata qe nuk blejn gazeta.



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Qe ni shkrim i per Nexhat Dacin nga Enver Hasani


“Unguibus et Rostro”: vetėm pėr njė gjė z. Daci e pati mirė


 


Kairo dhe sirenat e Nexhat Dacit


 


Kohė  mė parė kisha parė njė debat interesant nė TV Al Jazzera rreth asaj nėse lutjet nga  xhamitė e shumta nė Kairo, mbi dy mijė sosh, paraqisnin pengesė pėr qytetarėt e kryeqytetit tė faraonėve. Esenca e debatit qe kjo: a janė shqetėsuese zėrat e imamėve tė cilėt bėjnė lutjet fetare sipas ritit mysliman, ajo qė ne i themi thirrje e ezanit, tė cilėt mė fuqinė e zmadhuesve modern ndėrhyjnė domosdo nė aktivitetet e pėrditshme qė zhvillohen aty. Disa thonin se duhej gjetur njė zgjidhje pėr zhurmėn qė lėshonin lutjet e zmadhuara tė imamėve egjiptas, tjerėt ndėrkaq pohonin se kėtu fjala ishte pėr njė komplot kundėr fesė islame e orkestruar nga tjerėt, me kuptim amerikanėt. Sot mu kujtua ky debat, kjo ngjarje, tek po shihja ish Kryetarin e Kuvendit tė Kosovės, tė cilėn mediat e quajtėn nė vazhdimėsi, kryeparlamentari i Kosovės, zotin Nexhat Daci, mbase pėr tė treguar simbolikisht se nė Kosovė kishte jetė parlamentare tė mirėfilltė dhe se z. Daci ishte njėri ndėr ata qė zhvillonin parlamentarizmin kosovar. Pa njė, pa dy, mė erdhėn nė mendje ngjashmėritė aq tė pėrpikta mė Kairon dhe sjelljet publike tė zotit Nexhat Daci. Mu kujtua, nė rend tė parė, sirena a tij e cila mė kishte larguar sa e sa herė nga rruga ime, pėr tė lėnė vend pėr tė, duke mė detyruar pa asnjė hak ta pėrcjellė zhurmėn e saj deri nė dromcėn e fundit tė akustikės sė sirenės Daci, sirenė qė mbyllej bashkė mė rrugėt e ndotura dhe tė shėmtuara tė kryeqytetit tonė, tė cilat i ngjasojnė as mė shumė e as mė pak, anės jo-evropiane tė Kairos, jo anės ku ishte lujatur Aida e Verdit nė dekadėn e tetė tė shekullit tetėmbėdhjetė. Mėnyra e sjelljes publike flet pėr shumėēka, jo pse mė ka trazuar si qytetar i kėtij vendi, por sepse mė ka shtuar edhe mė shumė atė skeptcizimin tim permanent qė e kam shprehur nė vazhdimėsi lidhur mundėsinė e bėrjes shtet sovran dhe tė pavarur tė kėtij vendi. Ajo sjellje, qė lente pėrshtypjen e njė personaliteti qė ka tė rreshtuar njė armatė tė fuqishme, njė ekonomi shumė vitale e konkurrente, njė demokraci e sistem politik qė tjerėt e kėrkojnė dhe lakmojnė pėr model. Gjėja e parė qė mė ka rėnė ndėrmend dje, kur u bė shkarkimi i tij nga cilėsia e kryetarit tė Kuvendit ka qenė: a do tė jetė pasardhėsi i tij i njėjtė nė sjellje publike si zoti Daci? Tė shpresojmė se morėn fund sirenat qė linin pėrshtypjen e njė atentati nė kryerje e sipėr, ose tė njė vitaliteti socio-ekonomik , politik dhe ushtarak tė atij qė i urdhėronte.


 


Llastikat dhe fyerja publike e opinionit


 


Nėse Presidenti i ndjerė Rugova ka pasur ēdo arsye pėr tė qenė nėn pėrkujdesje tė vazhdueshme nga rreziku permanent qė e ka ndjekur atė nga kundėrshtarėt e tij tė shumtė, kjo nuk mund t’i falet askujt tjetėr. Jo vetėm pėr  faktin se ai ka kontrolluar gjatė tėrė kohės sė tij nė politikė pėrmbi 70 pėr qind tė votuesve kosovar dhe ka pasur njė apel universal nė botėn shqiptare, pa marrė parasysh cilėsinė e tij tė udhėheqjes, por edhe sepse realisht ka qenė i sulmuar pėr vdekje nė vazhdimėsi. Kjo nuk u lejohet tjerėve: Quod licet Jovi, non licet bovi, e kanė thėnė latinėt. Mbase ata qė kanė synuar ta kopjojnė tė ndjerin President Rugova nuk e kanė tė qartė se pas tij e kanė tė vėshtirė njė gjė tė tillė. Derisa atij i rrinte mirė imitimi i botės perėndimore, nė veēanti i SHBA-ve dhe i liderėve tė kėtij vendi, kur vinte nė kokė kapelėn ngjashėm si presidentėt amerikan, kėtyre qė synojnė t’ia zėnė vendin atij, sikur u del puna mbrapsht: paraqitja nė tuta, ose nė trenerka siē thotė kosovari i zakonshėm, ishte njė ofendim kolektiv i tė gjithė atyre qė e kanė parė sonte z. Daci, siē ishin edhe llastikat sipėr supeve tė tij.  Kam pasur rastin tė shoh, nė vlugun e luftės pėr lirinė e kėtij vendi, funksionarė tė lartė tė Kosovės tė dalin pėr tė pritur delegacionet e ndryshme nė brekė tė shkurtra, por kjo ndodhte nė Tiranė dhe nė njė kohė kur, siē thotė populli, derri plasė prej sė nxehti. Por, tė dalėsh nė tuta, me llastikė tė vėnė mbi kėmishė, sikur ky vend po feston 200 vjetorin e ekzistimit tė tij si shtet sovran dhe i pavarur, pa qenė asnjė fushatė zgjedhur askund afėr, kjo vėrtetė ėshtė poshtėrim i tėrė neve qė pamė e dėgjuam sot z. Daci.  


 


Kosova dhe vendet e mėdha, demokracia dhe si qeverisja


 


Megjithatė, kur njeriu dėgjon mė afėr se ēfarė thonė tjerėt, pastaj fillon disi t’i arsyetoj gabimet e tyre. Derisa po dėgjoja krahasimet e Kosovės me Britaninė e Madhe, Gjermaninė, Japoninė dhe shumė vende tė pėrparuara, u stepa si i marrė dhe i thashė vetes: shiko, ky nuk paska ditur se Kosova nuk ėshtė demokraci presidenciale? E pabesueshme, por e vėrtetė! Tjerėt do tė thonin se z. Daci mė kėto krahasime manifeston ndjenjat e tij megalomane. Unė kėtė nuk e them sepse njė gjė tė tillė e bėjė me ndonjė prej studentėve tė dobėt tė Shkencave Politike, kur tenton tė krahasoj kėtė vend me vendet e pėrparuara tė botės, tė cilat i kanė dhėnė vulė historisė sė njerėzimit qė nga para Krishti e kėndej.


 


Mėnyra si Daci bėri konceptimin e sistemit parlamentar nė Kosovė vėrtetė shkakton lemeri pėr ne si qytetarė tė rėndomtė tė kėtij vendi. I ngjason atij tregimit serb kur fshatarėt i kishin shkuar prapa liderit tė tyre deri nė momentin kur ai po i shtynte nė greminė. Nė atė moment, njėri nga ta e kishte pyetur liderin serb nėse ai e dinte se kah po i shpinte fshatarėt e shkretė. Lideri, aty-pėr-aty, u kishte treguar se ishte i verbėr dhe se kishte menduar se fshatarėt e dinin njė gjė tė tillė. Unė, pranoj tė jem edhe naiv, nuk e kam ditur deri sonte se z. Daci nuk e ka pasur tė qartė natyrėn e sistemit parlamentar tė Kosovės. E kam mbrojtur z. Daci  aty ku kam mundur, edhe pėr faktin se ka qenė nga i njėjti universitet ku edhe unė punoj, si njė akademik i shquar dhe si njė njeri qė ka bashkėndier me ne vuajtjet qė sankilotėt po i shkaktonin Universitetit tė Prishtinės nė vitet e pas luftės. Por, sot u zhgėnjeva sa nuk ka mė. U ndjeva i lumtur qė nuk kisha pranuar tė jem kėshilltar i tij menjėherė pasi kishte marrė postin e Kryetarit tė Kuvendit, sado qė atėherė pėr arsye krejt tjera pata refuzuar njė gjė tė tillė.


 


Zyra Amerikane si biznes privat ?!


 


Kulmi i zhgėnjimit tim, tek po dėgjoja sonte zotin Daci, arriti kur ai i quajti krejt personale dhe ēėshtje biznesi punėt e raporteve tė tij me shefin e Zyrės Amerikane nė Prishtinė. Ai nuk ia tha emrin, por u mor vesh se pėr kėnd ėshtė fjala. SHBA-tė nė Kosovė kanė vetėm njė zyrė dhe vetėm njė pėrfaqėsues. Vendet serioze dhe qė sot e bėjnė ligjin ndėrkombėtar nuk mund tė kenė dy shefa tė zyrave, dy zyra dhe dy ambasada.  SHBA-tė nė veēanti  nuk mund tė dėrgojnė njerėz pėr biznes privat diku, qoftė edhe nė vendet e lėna tė kėtij rruzulli tokėsor, lėre mė nė Kosovė, ndėr vendet mė jetike dhe mė me rėndėsi pėr interesin nacional amerikan. Tė thuash sot, i veshur nė tuta dhe me llastikė pėrreth krahėve, sikur tė ishte fjala pėr emisar special tė njė fuqie tė madhe perandorake, se SHBA-tė kanė njė politikė tjetėr nga ajo qė thonė pėrfaqėsuesit e tyre nėpėr botė, kjo ėshtė mė shumė se ofendim pėr atė vend, por edhe pėr Kosovėn si njė aleate dhe mike tė devotshme e SHBA-ve, e kėtij vendi me tė cilin na ndanė njė Oqean, por na bashkojnė shumė brenga dhe interesa. Ajo qė z. Daci e thotė se ka pasur disa zyrtarė tjerė tė administratės amerikane qė kanė thėnė ndryshe nga ajo qė mund t’i ketė thėnė Shefi i Zyrės Amerikane nė Prishtinė, nuk ėshtė veēse lexim i gabuar i mesazhit diplomatik dhe moskuptim elementar i funksionimit tė shteteve tė forta, i fuqive kolosale, dhe, mbi tė gjitha, moskuptim i tėrėsishėm i politikės sė Jashtme amerikane dhe i mėnyrės si krijohet dhe zbatohet ajo.


 


Njollosja e tė gjithėve


 


Nuk mund tė mos vėrej edhe njė fakt tjetėr qė mė bėri pėrshtypje dhe qė u pėrdredh nė memorien time tė zhgėnjimit nga z. Daci: fakti i njollosjes sė tė gjithėve. Diskutimi i tij sikur linte pėrshtypje se Kosova ėshtė e izoluar me armiq tė brendshėm e tė jashtėm. Ma pėrkujtoi njė kohė tė ngjashme nė tė cilėn kishin kaluar disa nga liderėt e Shtetit shqiptar me 1996-1997, tė cilėt po ashtu kishin lexuar gabimisht mesazhet e miqve tė vėrtetė tė shqiptarėve. Si mund tė ndodhė qė tė njėjtė njerėz tė jenė gabim tani, u mor vesh me pėrjashtim te z. Daci ?!. Pra , po ata njerėz qė kishin bėrė kėtė koalicion qeveritar njė vit mė herėt. Kundėr kėtij koalicioni shumė kush ka patur rezervė, pėrfshirė edhe autorin e kėtyre rreshtave. Skeptizicimi i njerėzve tė ndershėm ndaj koalicionit ka qenė real dhe vetė diskutimi i sotėm i z. Daci tregon se ata kanė pasur tė drejtė sepse procesi politik po bėhet mė i paparashikueshėm ēdo ditė e mė shumė,  konjkuturat politike mė fragjile se dikur sa ishte i ndjeri President Rugova gjallė. Nė esencė, vdekja e tė ndjerit President Rugova ka lėnė zhveshur tė gjithė ata qė tani z. Daci i duken si armiq. Asgjė nuk ka ndryshuar, pėrveē rrethanės qė mė nuk ėshtė i gjallė njeriu qė ka ruajtur kohezivitetin e koalicionit qeveritar dhe qetėsinė shpirtėrore tė shumicės sė shqiptarėve tė Kosovės. Por, mė duhet tė pranoj, zoti Daci pati tė drejtė shumė kur insistoi nė respektimin e rregullave tė demokracisė, tė institutit tė votės sė lirė sepse vota , sado e manipuluar qė tė jetė, kurrė nuk sjell nė syprinė njerėz tė papėrgjegjshėm, njerėz tė kėqij. Kėtu jam me ty, z Daci, por nuk kam qenė me ty kur po nė kėtė logjikė ke bėrė e ribėrė tė gjitha qeveritė dhe strukturat politike tė kėtij vendi, prej mbarimit tė luftės e kėndej.  Hiq kėtė shqetėsim tendin pėr votėn e lirė, ēdo gjė tjetėr qe the sonte ka qenė, pėrveē ofendim publik i ndjenjave tė qytetarėve tė Kosovės dhe tė tė gjithė atyre qė tė kanė shikuar, qasje Ungiubus et Rostro.


 


Enver HASANI


Autori ėshtė profesor i tė drejtės dhe marrdhėnieve ndėrkombėtare


 



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Qe edhe ni shkrim qe u botu nje dit ne lajm prap shkrim i Enver Hasanit


LAJM: Gjykata Nderkombetare e Drejtesise sot fillon shqyrtimin e percaktimit nese tere nje popull - Serbia mund te jete fajtor per krimet me te renda kunder njerezimit - gjenocid ne Bosnje dhe Kroaci. Cfare rendesie ka kjo per drejtesine nderkombetare ?


 HASANI: Nuk flitet kėtu pėr gjykimin e tėrė njė populli, sic e thoni ju. Fjala ėshtė pėr njė procedurė qė ka filluar mė 1993 nė Gjykatėn Ndėrkombėtare tė Drejtėisssė lidhur me zbatimin e Konventės mbi Pengimin dhe Ndėshkimin e Krimitė tė Gjenocidit , e cila ėshtė nė fuqi qė nga vititi 1951 dhe njihet ndryshe edhe si “Konventa e Gjenocidit”. Kjo don tė thotė se kjo procedurė duhet tė shikojė nėse ka vend pėr pėrgjegjėsi tė Unionit Serbi dhe Mali I Zi pėr moszbatim tė kėsaj konvente. Sipas kėsaj konvente tė gjitha shtetet e botės janė tė detyruara ėt pengojnė dhe ndėshkojnė krimin e gjenocidit. Mos zbatimi I saj tėrheqė pėrgjeegjėsinė e shtetit pėr cėnim tė sė drejtės ndėrkomėbatre. Ajo pėrgjegjėsi nuk ėshtė penale. Kjo don tė thoitė se “shteti nuk mund tė futet nė burg” pėr moszbatim tė saj..


LAJM : Ne krimet ne Bosnje, qe kishin per qellim zhdukjen e popullit boshnjak ka marre pjese ushtria dhe policia serbe, por qe ne forma te ndryshme ka qene i perfshire edhe populli apo individe serbe. Si rrjedhoje e kesaj, a duhet te gjykohet tere populli serb per krimet e bera ne Bosnje ?


 HASANI: E drejta dhe praktika ndėrkombėtare nuk njohin kategorinė e pėrgjegjėsisė kolektive tė njė populli ose kombi. Pėrgjegjėsia penale e shtetit nuk ekziston.


LAJM: Sipas avokateve boshnjak, parimi kryesor ne te cilin do te perqendrohet  gjykata qendron ne ate se a ishte shteti i Serbise, e jo vetm grupe apo individe, ai qe kishte per qellim t'i shfaroste myslimanet si komunitet nga tere Bosnja Lindore. Nese po, si do te mund te ndeshkohet tere nje popull ?


HASANI: Kjo don tė thotė se Gjykata mund tė vėrtetojė se tėrė shteti serb, pėrkatėsisht Unioni Serbi dhe Mali i Zi, si trashgėimtare e Republikės Federative tė Jugosllavisė, e cila trashėgon dhe pėrgjegjėsinė e atij shteti, ka qenė e involvuar nė krimin e gjenocidit dhe pėr pasojė ka shkelur Konventėn e Gjenocidit.


 LAJM: Nese Gjykata vendos ne favor tė Bosnjes, cfare do demshperblimi apo riparimi do t'i ofrohet asaj ?


HASANI: Ai dėmshpėrblim mund tė jetė prej kėrkimit tė faljes popullit boshnjak e deri tė kompenzimi material viktimave tė gjenocidit nė Bosnje-Herecgovinė dhe vetė Shtetit tė Bosnje-Hercegovinės. 


LAJM: Dhe a besoni qe Serbia do t'i nenshtrohet rezultatit te Gjykates Nderkombetare te Drejtesise, qe mund te jete ne disfavor te saj. Gjithashtu cfare denimi mund t'i shqiptohet Serbise?


 HASANI: Unė besoj se shoqėria serbe pas Millosehviēit , nė planin ndėrkombėtar ėshtė mė e pėrgjgjeshme dhe mė e vėtėdijshme pėr pasojat negative tė sjelljeve tė kqija se mė parė. Kjo shihet edhe nga fakti qė mė 2001 ata kanė pranuar kushtet e trashėgimit nė Vjenė, kur kanė lidhur njė marrėvehsje me ish republikat jugosllave pėr mbylljen e procesit tė trashėgimit tė ish Jugoslavisė. Ai process ka zgjatur mbi dhjetė vjet. Nuk ka arsye qė serbėt tė sillen ndryshe nė kėtė rast, pra nėse Gjykata Ndėrkombėtare e Drejtėsisė vendos nė favor tė popullit dhe Shtetit tė Bosnje-Herceogivnės



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Qetu e postova ni raport tė marek antoni nowicki veq po pritoj me perkthy, kshtu qe lexone veq ju qe flisni anglisht edhe ju qe e kuptoni a ju tjeret qe nuk dini anglisht mos u munoni hiq hahahaha lexim t'kanshem


Pjesa e par


Marek Antoni Nowicki


International Ombudsperson in Kosovo (2000 – 2005)


Kosovo pro memoria


Following international political decisions to accelerate the localization of the Ombudsperson Institution, I was forced to leave Kosovo on the eve of what is the decisive phase of the international intervention in this province, i.e. talks aimed at finding a solution concerning its political and international legal status. During more than five years in Kosovo as the international Ombudsperson I had ample opportunities to closely observe and analyze the most important aspects of the unfolding situation, to point out governmental mistakes and lack of action, to publicly highlight human rights problems and the manner of dealing with them by international and local administration. 


In this critical period, after the end of my mandate, I decided to put together in one short paper selected thoughts about different aspects of the situation there based on my “on-the-ground” experience and to present it to the main actors of the “Kosovo project.” I do expect that it will be read and used in the context of any further discussion for the sake of all people in Kosovo. 


Introduction


The international community, local Albanian leaders, Serbian leaders in Belgrade, as well as other stakeholders in Kosovo are fully engaged in the shuttle diplomacy efforts that will determine the final status of the province. At the helm of this process is the United Nations appointed Special Envoy for Kosovo status talks, former Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari, who is known for his role as the European Union special envoy for Kosovo in the June 1999 peace agreements.


On one side are the ethnic Albanians, who constitute approximately 90% of the Kosovo population. For their part, nothing less than an independent state is acceptable, and few observing Kosovo’s political evolution over the last near seven years would deny that this is not a distinct possibility. Indeed, following the February 2006 UN Security Council meeting on the Kosovo question, current political winds hint clearly to at least some form of conditional independence1.


On the other hand, Kosovo Serbs reject outright the idea of independence. They see in the Kosovo independence movement an ethnic cleansing of the province, part of a greater plan to unite Albanians under a “one-state” project. If Kosovo is accorded some form of independence, then many ethnic Serbs would be bereft of a place seen historically and mythically, as the cradle of Serbian cultural and spiritual identity. Independence in this case would relegate Serbs to “minority” status for a population that has long thought of themselves as a part of a larger entity – that of Serbia-proper. The international community has already dubbed them “minority” –– a term that beyond the political expediency of the designation, Serbs on the ground in Kosovo refuse to openly accept. Certain suspensions of disbelief with the Serb community also put them in opposition to the real powerbrokers operating within the framework of nation-building, i.e. the tight knit network of big Kosovo Albanian families who run the region in a somewhat clan–like fashion - a fact that Kosovo Serbs will have to contend with whatever the ultimate outcome of the status process. 


What is Kosovo today? Poverty is widespread and considerable numbers of people endure difficult, even harsh, daily living conditions. There is a significant gap between those who are receiving meager social-welfare assistance and those who are not. Not to mention the far-reaching unemployment levels and the rapidly expanding youth base (up to half the population is under 25; 40% under 18) that has been given few meaningful prospects to work towards.


Missing people and forgiveness


The story of the missing still weighs heavy in the collective consciousnesses. It as an emotionally charged issue for both Albanian and Serbian communities. Families of the missing – Albanian, Serbian and others - live in a perpetual state of limbo over the unknown fate of their relatives. In most cases these families look desperately for any sign or evidence that their loved one(s) remains alive. While a considerable number of non-Albanians have gone missing in Kosovo, Albanians, mainly victims of operations by Serb paramilitaries or other units, make up the clear majority of the missing. 


After nearly seven years, there is certainly some progress in the process of discovering details which make up the dramatic truth, and there has been movement with regards to the terms of reference for those representatives from Pristina and Belgrade trying to have closure on the issue2.


When speaking about missing Albanians, the question of what efforts are being made by Serbia and Montenegro (SaM) to resolve the situation inevitably occurs.  Serbian society and its leadership should show that every effort is being made to help the many Kosovo Albanian families learn the exact fate of their missing relatives. It is in the interest of Serbia and its future to look into this question regarding what happened to all of these people, despite how horrifying the truth may be. People in Serbia must be prepared to accept and navigate these emotionally charged issues.  Most importantly, this work and these efforts must be undertaken in a proactive, rather than reactive manner.   


From a broader perspective, there seems to be little serious public reflection or general public debate in SaM about the operations that took place in Kosovo, which were allegedly carried out on their behalf, before and after North Atlantic Treaty Organization air strikes in 1999. Relatively few criminal cases have been tried in Serbian courts, and there has been no visible public support for these efforts. A large part of Serbian society does not appear to consider such trials as helping them come to terms with the recent past in Kosovo.  These still isolated criminal cases are not really a part of any larger process of reckoning, which would signal a break from the general civic attitude toward this inconceivable legacy. Historically, the overall reaction has been to escape confronting the unbearable truths, either by denial, defensive posture, or to reject the subject outright.   


All those responsible need to one day stand before the courts and face justice- people involved not only in these crimes but similar acts, notwithstanding their nationality, position, or current orientation to political structures that exist. The guilt must be recognized and acknowledged sincerely. There is no chance for even the beginning of the much needed forgiveness process, not to speak about future reconciliation, without justice being served, or at least a much more serious effort put forth in this direction. Moreover, without reconciliation, is it really possible for the international community to speak about regional stability even with a status solution?


Until now the problem has been that the society – in Serbia proper and in Kosovo - has not had the strength to confront the past, even the darkest part.  At the same time, only after such a profoundly therapeutic experience, will the society be rehabilitated enough to escape this legacy of violence and mutual wrongdoing that has characterized communal factionalism in the Balkans for so long.


To forgive and be forgiven is an aspect missing from the Kosovo process. Collective effort is needed to try to acknowledge the enormous suffering endured by people there. As time moves on, forgiveness is an unavoidable outcome for a forward looking society that politically wants to strengthen Euro-Atlantic relations. One should remember also that to forgive is not white-washing a wrong, and does not mean sidestepping justice. Perpetrators must be held accountable.  Forgiveness is also important for the victims. It is a lengthy process that must be launched despite dominant misconceptions that it is anti-patriotic or a sign of weakness.  Nor is it an effort to bury the past and forget. The difficult truths must be exposed.  In order to seek justice for those truths, people must acknowledge their past involvement and contribution to the difficult times. 


As the international community brokers the ultimate solution for Kosovo, local groups must be ready to listen, until the end, to even the most inconvenient truths.  The air must be cleared between communities in order to forge new, be they practical or political, relations. Such a process cannot be politically rushed, although it seems as if time is not something the international community is willing to gamble with at this stage.  If in this course of action the people of Kosovo fail to make any meaningful progress in confronting the past, then the work of the international community will be incomplete.  People will be unprepared to implement the values that are generally understood as being at the heart of the democratic principles often touted by the international community as the ultimate political and social aim of Kosovo’s evolution. It must, however, be reiterated that failing to deal with the missing and initiate reconciliation in the march towards status would be akin to building a house on the unstable terrain of a sand dune. 


Other non – Albanian communities


Under the current circumstances, large numbers of Kosovo inhabitants are experiencing hardship. This being said, the people who tend to suffer principally are the most vulnerable populations, usually, but not limited to, the non-Albanian communities. According to recent statements made at the February UN Security Council meeting on the question of Kosovo3 much work still must be done to improve the overall situation of the minority communities in the province.


Nonetheless, the framework of bi-polar aspirations, Albanian and Serbian, certainly skews the concept of “multi-ethnicity” in Kosovo. Indeed, realistically, “multi-ethnicity” in Kosovo is based on theoretical models crafted by those determining international policy. In the immediate future, there is little chance of meaningful success on this front. Kosovo communities, in particular Albanian and Serbian have never lived together, rather they have been juxtaposed in living separate lives for much of their co-habitation. The multiethnic society in Kosovo remains a part of international political rhetoric. Need I mention that it is not only a question of the Serb-Albanian framework, but to different extents also of other non-Albanians whose rights and needs are too frequently overlooked or simply ignored. 


What does it mean to protect ethnic minorities? Good laws can be promulgated and special programs can be designed, but if there is no sincere societal will to adopt these changes in everyday life then there is little perspective to alter the dismal status quo. 


Is the society at large able to create a meaningful space for these communities in a situation in which nearly everyone is struggling?  It is natural in difficult times to see a widespread attitude of self-preservation, looking out for one’s own family and community in order to survive.  So many in Kosovo are tired, hungry, and poor, but it cannot serve as an excuse for a situation in which non-Albanian communities experience greater proportional hardship in these conditions. Certainly in Kosovo, relations are further hindered by the many open wounds, which do not help to change people’s attitudes.  A great deal of anger, frustration and pain of the past thickens the air among Kosovo people.  The roots of these emotions easily stretch back generations, punctuated in recent years by repression and armed conflict.  A collective sense of having been victimized at the hands of an easily identified "other," usually found among a particular ethnic group, taints almost every aspect of daily life. 


As such, these volatile emotions take on a character of self-righteous anger, targeting the "other."   That sense of purpose tends to manifest in an impassioned effort to correct the injustice perpetrated against them, their family, and their community. Such a compelling sense of purpose makes it possible for many to feel good or simply justified by their indignation and outrage.  Ultimately, however, this emotional state too regularly leads to distorted thinking and persisting animosity. UN officials have also acknowledged a sense of disparity between what is part of written policy and what is part of solid implementation where standards are concerned4. This is doubly so where minorities are concerned, especially when concerned with the non-Serbian minorities.


What does Kosovo have to offer Europe in the future if their inhabitants simply see an ethnic classification walking towards them on the street - Serb, Roma, Ashkali, or Albanian?  What of a shared identity? Moving away from a tribal outlook typical of pre-modern societies, it indicates a society on the defensive which views the “other” as a risk or threat. 


If the majority of people are unwilling to accept minorities, then they are, at the same time, saying they do not accept them as human beings deserving of the same rights and privileges that they themselves are supposed to enjoy.  Thinking exclusively along ethnic lines has produced disastrous results there, and it seems only natural to talk over this reality acknowledging that something must be done with a commitment to open up the dialogue in a manner that would address the concept of societal inclusivity.


In order to assure politically correct actions towards minority communities and to assure better conditions for them, the government and political leaders in Kosovo must also be willing to address the general life hardships suffered by a large part of the majority Albanian population. For this reason, it is paramount to maintain a balance with the messages communicated to the general public, whether it is with politicians’ words or the manner in which public institutions interface practically with the population.


Having said this, it stands to reason that they should support all efforts to try to convince minorities that there is a rightful place for them in society and not merely to live as second-class people.   


Roma


Roma, as with all of Kosovo’s people, should be accorded the same fundamental human rights.  Roma interests need to be considered with equal measure to the other more integrated parts of society.  Although Albanian and Serb communities stress their ancestral roots in their various attempts to legitimize cultural legitimacy within Kosovo, the same applies to the Roma who are just as much a part of the social fabric and legacy of this land.   


When considering the fate of non- Albanian communities, one must invariably question what the future holds for the Kosovo Roma, Ashkali or Egyptians (RAE). The Roma’s perspective is to a considerable degree dependent on the survival of Kosovo Serbs. For centuries, Roma had lived in or around Serbian settlements. In 1999, they paid an extremely serious price for that, in particular, but not only, in Mitrovica, where more than 6,000 Roma were cruelly forced from their homes in their mahalla, or community, by groups of Kosovo Albanians bent on dealing with those perceived as collaborators.   


Many of these ethnically cleansed Roma from Mitrovica stay in inhuman conditions in camps in North Kosovo5 located on land that was contaminated with heavy metal, despite obvious and urgent need for their evacuation to safer environs. Although there has been some progress in the process leading to the reconstruction of the Mitrovica Roma mahalla, more politically expedient issues related to economic and democratic progress continue to take precedence over the immediate needs of the Roma population – a phenomenon not unique to Kosovo.


Recent developments do find UNMIK and the World Health Organization aligned in their concerns about the immediate health crises and the ultimate relocation of the internally displaced Roma (IDP’s) living in North Kosovo to a former KFOR camp, Osterode. However, they have been unwilling to convincingly guarantee the Roma that indeed Osterode will not be a permanent solution. UNMIK officials have committed verbally that Osterode will not deter the international actors and the local municipality in question from getting the more than 6,000 Roma IDP’s back to the Mahalla6, but the Roma are rightfully skeptical given their current shantytowns were meant to exist for no more than 45 to 90 days. Roma communities in other parts of Kosovo can also attest to similar negative “temporary” moves that have since become permanent housing situations.


 
Thousands of other Roma families in Serbia, Montenegro or elsewhere in the Diaspora wait to return to Kosovo. As all others displaced from their points of origin, they also have the right to be back in their homes and to be permitted to rebuild their lives without fear of repeated, targeted aggression. NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) have joined the UN administration and local policing structures in assuring the public that security levels are at their best since the end of fighting in 1999, but what of the collective outlook of the majority population, whose attitude really determines the level of security for the displaced Roma?


The extreme vulnerability of the whole Roma community is evident. How many of their houses have been reconstructed over these years?  The widespread violence targeting Kosovo’s non-Albanian settlements in March 2004 illustrated how the individuals, who committed such crimes against Roma in 1999 are ready to do the same again. 


A justified fear exists that within the defining of status, the bi-polar frame of competing political forces, Albanian versus Serb, will force the Roma off the road of greater inclusion. Although the international community has made it a point to mention the Roma in the context of security and integration, one needs to impress on the majority Albanian population the idea that the Roma are indeed an integral part of Kosovo’s societal fabric – something that will take generations of efforts, to be sure. Nonetheless, it is a process that must begin sooner than later. 


Security


The general perception of insecurity among Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanians is based on past negative experiences of violence during the last near seven years: random killings, assaults, bombings, thefts and incidents of arson and stoning. Seldom have perpetrators been identified or brought to justice, contributing to a perception that these acts can be committed with impunity.


Of course, this is framed in the context of an obvious backlash from the insecurity felt by the ethnic Albanian population immediately before and during the Kosovo conflict as the Serbian security apparatus crafted its handy work of intimidation and ethnic attacks/killings in their desire to quell the separatist aspirations of a segment of the Albanian population. 


Any change in the mutual insecurity felt in this respect and any building up of legitimate feelings of tolerance is a long process. The violent events of March 2004 significantly (if not irreparably) damaged the situation. This wave of violence left a traumatic emotional imprint and painfully reminded non-Albanian communities of 1999, when violent reprisals against Serbs and Roma were at an all-time high.  The March 2004 events showed that violence in Kosovo may reappear at anytime. It has demonstrated how easy it was to destroy the relative “calm” that has prevailed on the surface of Kosovo’s society. Nothing surprising that now it has become almost second nature for at least some non-Albanian communities to feel insecure where they live in Kosovo. 


Return 


Almost seven years ago, a United Nations-led administration arrived in Kosovo under the presence of NATO peacekeepers, while masses of Serbs and other non-Albanians left following a reverse ethnic cleansing. Many of these people still reside today in Serbia or Montenegro living in precarious circumstances and without a proper legal status. It is not too difficult then to understand the international community’s ill ease as these families continue to leave despite repeated calls for return. Nobody has gathered exact figures documenting how many Serbs and other non-Albanians have left the province. The pattern exists however and was strengthened especially after the violent events experienced in March 2004. One would be hard-pressed to ignore what these communities have endured over a period of almost seven years. 


Even with a significant amount of money and labor dedicated to returns, the results of the return efforts have been truly dismal.  
 
Why has the returns process not progressed in a meaningful manner?  Many IDPs openly speak about their perception of a lack of security for their communities. Violent attacks, even if not as frequent as before, still exist, as do considerable tensions between ethnic communities in Kosovo. 


The general economic stagnation is among the core factors that contribute to this lack of returns.  Particularly hard hit are the non-Albanian communities.  Most of the families who have decided to return to Kosovo are reliant on humanitarian assistance. Much of what was their properties, flats, and farmlands have been occupied, stolen or are lost in some sort of legal limbo.  Meanwhile, given the overall situation and a lack of clarification of the province’s status, many of these properties have been sold very cheaply, particularly in urban areas.  These property “buy-outs” continue. As well, dwellings rebuilt after the end of fighting in 1999 were once again destroyed in the March 2004 riots.  Many Serbs continue to stay in Kosovo only because of the existence of Serb parallel structures and the support provided by Belgrade and non-governmental aid organizations.   


The return efforts seem to be very much concentrated on simply constructing shelter. Although important, it is just one piece of a very complicated puzzle of rebuilding lives. The returnee’s prospects to till the land and provide markets for their produce, send their children to school and re-enter the Kosovo job market are likely to be hampered for a long time to come. Thus, returnees will require a sustained artificial donor base to assure that they are at least given social welfare and subsistence rations until Kosovo’s economy actually begins to function.


The returns issue also begs the question of how to encourage young people to return or remain in Kosovo. The youth represent the bedrocks of any potential societal growth, and it is not enough to have people coming back to merely exist and die on their land. It is a question of having enough educated, professional people to strengthen the community. For this reason, urban return is so crucial but it seems somewhat a dream given the backdrop of a rather discouraging reality that casts serious doubts over the sustainability of any returns program. It is difficult to think that an independent Kosovo could encourage any return of non-Albanian residents.   


On the other hand, people who, for whatever reasons, decide to stay in the place of their current residence must at the same time have the conditions created for their integration.  The politically motivated miracles of the returns process cannot be a justification for indefinitely extending the status and living conditions of potential returnees who are at their most vulnerable. Of course this is primarily the responsibility of Serbia and Montenegrin authorities, but at the same time there is the obligation of the international community to provide adequate help.  They are duty bound to see to the welfare of IDPs considering that the situation in the province is not – and will not be prepared for their return. This also will mean being realistic about a steady source of extra-governmental money that will facilitate such a reality. 



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Japani

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Pjesa e dyt e raportit te Nowickit


Forced return


Several European countries have concluded agreements with Kosovo’s UN administration (UNMIK) for the forcible return of unsuccessful asylum seekers from the province. The practice has been occurring for some time and is expected to gain momentum given that the situation on the ground is said to be improving, at least according to the international stakeholders and local municipal authorities. 
 
People who fled Kosovo and have often spent the greater part of a decade in “adopted” countries are now told that they are no longer welcome and that it is time they went “home.”


 
The “home” they know of may not only hold negative memories for these refugees, but many of them, including children, simply do not know the place to which they must now return. Not to mention that the communities they left may no longer exist. In Kosovo, where unemployment is rampant and the budget deep in the red it is not realistic to assume that they will be able to make a living – a problem echoed in the overall conundrum of creating a sustainable returns program. This is especially difficult for those who happen to belong to a minority, such as the Ashkali or Roma.


Not only are these people returned to Kosovo against their will; the return is in some countries selective, targeting primarily individuals with a criminal record. Since many of the people who fled Kosovo over the years are members of minorities, this selective repatriation only serves to reinforce the negative stereotypes that parts of the Albanian majority hold about them, i.e. theives, beggars, cheats, collaborators, etc.  
 
For the moment however forced returns from Western Europe are a reality and must be dealt with accordingly. UNMIK, the Kosovo government, and the province’s municipalities need to create some sort of infrastructure to handle the influx of these new inhabitants. As is the case with less controversial returns projects, forced returnees need to be provided with shelter, employment opportunities, and language courses for children. The government must develop special programs to help them integrate into Kosovo society through social assistance and social housing.  
 
Aside from the obligation of UNMIK and of the Kosovo government to initiate such programs, citizens and municipalities must deal with this issue head on and understand that it is their duty to create the conditions necessary for the returnees to be able to establish a real home there; the consequence for not doing creating these conditions will no doubt put massive strain on the social sector of future generations.


Organized crime


Credible reports have indicated that Kosovo has been a well known and important transit point or hub of multiple and large scale organized criminal activities7. Taking stock of the last two decades tainted by wars, sanctions, general unrest, etc. in Kosovo it is easy to see how organized crime elements took root or expanded their existing operations in the region and to distant lands abroad. The presence of international peace keepers in the region has also, even if indirectly, added to the rooted existence of organized crime by diverting attention away from more practical local initiatives reliant on the longstanding codes of interaction between Albanian family structures as a means of gathering intelligence. These international organizations set up shop in a land devoid of the rule of law and in a society which has struggled to survive for decades solely on limited resources, accepting lawlessness and corruption as a means of survival.


Thanks to their successful efforts forging close links with political players, crime groups have been able to operate with apparent impunity. These networks do not have to worry about vigilant law enforcement as they can rely on the weakness of the public institutions to sanction their operations. Well-meaning efforts by the international community at establishing what has become a locally controlled police force, the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) has not in fact deterred the growth of corruption in the province in large part because the KPS exists in a parallel/tandem universe with organized crime. According to certain analysts, elements of organized crime have penetrated and indeed influence the KPS structures with the end result being a lack of will to initiate comprehensive investigations in areas in which the larger criminal enterprises are at work. This is no doubt due to the fact that the international community has not effectively been able to address the interconnected elements of family and culture that have always existed with the Albanian community in Kosovo, and that cannot be discounted when trying to organize a police force where the people they train and hire are also part of this larger cultural milieu.


Corruption


Corruption issues are not limited to higher political and business circles or mafia networks, but exist within Kosovo’s institutions, educational and legal sector, health care facilities, et al.
Despite the pervasive scale of such abusive practices, corruption is very difficult to prove when there is little to no evidence indicating the offense. 


In an atmosphere in which corruption is so closely tied to everyday life and basic problems, of course people become slaves to this seemingly symbiotic relationship.  Rules of keeping silent and revenge are significant contributing factors to its acceptance.  
 
Corruption is, in fact, a process that makes it possible for others to decide the fate of people or of different aspects of their lives, one can say, in an arbitrary manner. The rules of how to function in a society are indelibly altered when law is rendered as irrelevant and the role of institutions made obsolete or abused.  It goes without saying that these practices regrettably seem to be deeply ingrained in today’s Kosovo8.


Legal chaos


Where legal issues are concerned, in many instances, those who tend to suffer are the people who try to follow the law in Kosovo.  I do not exclude others who disregard the law without repercussion or those who do not even think about the law.  It is a part of the larger issue of the seemingly regular practice of selective or arbitrary application of the law transforming the rule of law into the rule of convenience. 


Some seven years have passed, there are written laws in place; there are homegrown and internationally trained law enforcement agencies and officers; there are elected political leaders. The problem is however that too frequently they are unable or unwilling to use their power to defend the law in the common people’s interest. If the public authority does not have the power or will to implement the law one should then resign from any serious “rule of law” discussion.  Law exists only if executed by competent authorities, including imposing sanctions when necessary and against any violation- not just against selective, usually poor, members of society.  The tight knit communities, strong family network or other circles play a significant role here, understandably creating serious obstacles to anybody thinking sincerely about the law or even more about equality.


Rule of law cannot be equalized to rule of people abusing the law for their own particular self-serving interests. Serious oversight mechanisms already in place, like the courts, prosecutor offices or the ombudsperson must therefore be considerably strengthened and utilized if rule of law is actually to be a reality. Still, even if such local mechanisms exist, oversight by international structures and their reactions to at least flagrant abuses of rule of law must be much stronger, determined and based on principles rather than political convenience.


Justice


 
The justice system still has a rather bad rap in Kosovo, despite considerable local and international efforts to build a committed, independent judiciary in a post-conflict landscape.  Kosovo society, as I have mentioned, is dominated by a tight knit network of big Albanian families which run the region in a somewhat political clan-like fashion which understandably creates obstacles to anybody thinking sincerely about the law or even more about equality before the law.  The deeply entrenched social relations that exist in Kosovo society also very much extends to the judiciary. The obvious understanding should be that this profession will be undertaken in an unbiased manner.  However, the social allegiances of families and political circles are so deeply drawn in the sand that they could supersede official legal codes and even ethics.  As a result, there is a palpable sense of distrust of the “system”, frequently perceived by the population as being in the hands of certain interests.   


The presence, however limited, of the international judiciary is very much preferred by the local populace as a response to the conditions in which local judges and prosecutors perform their job. Sometimes one simply prefers to deliver justice into the hands of outsiders, rather than people who could be implicated in different ways here.    
 
An international judiciary is a temporary solution and will not remain in Kosovo forever.  One day Kosovo judges must take on all, even the most difficult, tasks their international counterparts are currently performing and to succumb to the very real pressures, threats, corruption and the strength of organized criminal elements.  
 
In Kosovo, particularly in some segments of society, there is an atmosphere in which the “official” justice is not necessarily preferred every time, especially when there is a long tradition of utilizing alternative remedies even if based on the customary law of the land.    Justice however must not be in the hands of others. But to generally accept the judges’ rulings, enough trust within the society must exist in the judiciary. Kosovo must not allow itself to drown in the waters of self-proclaimed or opportunistic justice, crime and corruption.  However, without a judiciary supported by the people there is no perspective in such matters. For its part, the international community has made more solid attempts at creating this infrastructure, but in this delicate time of transition from international protectorate to some form of defined status, pressure cannot be let up in this area.


Kosovo children


It has been almost seven years since all out armed conflict marred the landscape, but even before then, repression was evident and war was in the air as reports of the conflict in Bosnia and Croatia dominated the Balkans. When one considers this timeline, then you can see that all school aged children in Kosovo are products of war and a post-conflict environment. 
 
These experiences of the children of war influence the mental development of children. Of course many of these children were too young to remember first hand, or were born after the conflict.  
 
There are significant issues related to these children of war: many unknowingly suffer from post-traumatic disorders, they have fewer role models, and in too many instances lack guardians or parents. Children are growing up during these post-conflict years in an already difficult environment rife with high unemployment and further complicated by an uncertain political future. Many children are forced to find their own way in a strongly polarized atmosphere, learning to hate or are being taught that “others” are a threat. 
 
The consequences of such an upbringing are manifold and understandably confusing for young minds. One needs little reminder that the parents and families of this latest generation of children are also products of war and conflict.  The problem is that these fathers and families, unfortunately and totally understandably, have been very negatively influenced by these experiences. It is the obligation of the family to teach their children a value system without hate. In today’s Kosovo, children from different ethnic backgrounds almost never come into contact with their peers who, say, live in the enclaves or in psychologically very distant cities. This distinct separation and isolated environment ultimately leave children to learn from their families how to interact with these “neighbors”. This distance between the communities makes the situation worse and worse by permitting a negative impression to color an entire population.


Kosovo’s government would do well by firmly establishing programs whereby school children from the polarized communities are given opportunities to live and attend school outside of their insulated environs or at least to have, much more than today, opportunities to meet and to discover other young people in ethnically distinct settings. Only in this manner will Kosovo’s children be able to develop certain invigorated ideas about the world and its people without being influenced so much by dark thoughts of their parents or uncles tainted by the painful past experiences and resulting in the attitudes toward “others” as “antagonists.” Soon, these children must lead Kosovo towards a more democratic, tolerant and modern future. Nobody deciding Kosovo’s future can overstep this concrete fact.


Human rights protection


The people of Kosovo are among the very few in Europe who are uniquely excluded from basic legal human rights protection through the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg based Human Rights Court. The vast majority of people in Europe have the ability to sue their own authorities on equal footing in an international judicial forum dedicated to defend their basic rights, but the people of Kosovo are currently denied this course of action, even though the international administration portends to defend the right of Kosovo’s inhabitants to assume these basic rights.    
 
The protection of human rights is expressly written in the Constitutional Framework of Kosovo and in international instruments which is considered a part of law of the land. Yet, some seven years later, there are still too few mechanisms in place to ensure that such protections are in practice.     


The presence of the UN in Kosovo was very much initiated on humanitarian and human rights grounds.  However, owing to this presence, Kosovo remains, with a few exceptions, exempt from any international systems of human rights protection. Also, the UN and entities that are in Kosovo to help preserve human rights and the rule of law, at the same time, are themselves, in many respects, not answerable to the very persons they are obliged to protect, existing in a unique legal “otherness” that allows for the international community to impose its views on Kosovo’s inhabitants and structures while operating itself with impunity – “above the law.”  
 
In cases where Kosovans become the victims of human rights violations committed by UNMIK as such or its staff members, there is thus no independent body with judicial character that could intervene or allow these persons to obtain some sort of redress for damages or injuries.


In Kosovo, the international Ombudsperson had been the only existing and real legal instrument of human rights protection. Unfortunately, after the institution was turned over to local hands9, in the still chaotic, inadequate legal and institutional environment of Kosovo and for the very reason of the existence of objective circumstances tainted by the persisting interethnic conflict, the Ombudsperson Institution cannot insure in any respect the protection required.  Much more needs to be done. One must improve existing institutions and their performance as well as to build new judicial or other similar independent bodies, some of which will remain long after UNMIK has closed its doors.  One such aspiration is the constitutional chamber in the Supreme Court which has been discussed for some years now as a part of the Kosovo legal system and originally envisioned in its Constitutional Framework. Another option could be a separate constitutional tribunal.     
 
All aspects of the action or inaction of public, international and local authorities, including Kosovo judges, should be under independent scrutiny for human rights practices as in the rest of Europe, by the European Convention on Human Rights mechanism.  At the top is the Human Rights Court in Strasbourg, which could be replaced in the Kosovo context, temporarily – until the final status - by a similar court or other body of a comparable character.       


Notwithstanding of recent positive developments and UNMIK reports to the Council of Europe or the UN human rights covenants’ bodies, the existing level of protection of basic rights and freedoms is still far from acceptable. The respect of human rights and rule of law is the duty of any government. It should be expected that international institutions, which have taken general responsibility for Kosovo as well as KFOR contributing countries but also very much Kosovo authorities and its political leaders, better understand these critical human rights concepts and give to them the serious, due attention required.


Ending Remarks


It is clear for everyone in and outside of Kosovo that this year should be and is of the utmost importance for Kosovo.  There are however many problems and unanswered questions.  The road toward status resolution is very complex.


One of the central questions is whether realistically people in Kosovo can live together and the ability to reconcile the process leading to a final status and the creation of true conditions for everyone notwithstanding ethnicity to somehow have a peaceful, undisturbed life there. If there is a sincere will to make a change, to see the reintegration of returnees and to prepare solid ground for Serbs or Roma and others so they can see a place for themselves in Kosovo, then more visible efforts on behalf of the government, political leaders and municipal structures must be seen on the ground.


Notwithstanding the political solutions adopted, the future of Kosovo is in Europe, and should follow European standards of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and, especially in the context of Kosovo, the protection of the rights of minorities. Today, however, although the human rights situation has, to a degree, improved in sectors, the general level of protection of these rights is still below minimum international standards. A great deal must be done to strengthen the mechanisms for such protection. Apart from the need to cover many other important gaps Kosovo needs desperately to shape the legal system and to build a strong judiciary as indispensable parts of the rule of law and justice.


Every solution must in addition take into consideration the international law and the interests of the neighboring Balkan states guaranteeing basic conditions for regional stability and security. This terribly experienced province must sure-footedly step, together with other people of the region, on the path leading toward European Union integration.


It is indisputable that the concrete political and legal international status must be granted to Kosovo without any further delay. It does not mean however – in my view – that this status should be the “final” status. In order to reach the end game with final status, Kosovo should still be subject to carefully politically controlled processes and not held hostage only by the independence aspirations of the majority population.


1 Adam Thomson, the British envoy to the UN: "Any settlement should conclude during 2006…And it clearly cannot disregard the aspirations of 90% of the population of Kosovo, so independence is a realistic option." (Feb 15, 2006)


2 On March 16, 2005 the Working Group on Missing Persons meeting in Belgrade, Pristina and Belgrade representatives adopted the International Committee of the Red Cross list as the official list of missing persons of those people who went missing from January 1998 to December 2000.


3 Excerpt from United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Special Representative of the Secretary General, Sorren Jessen-Petersen’s speech to the UN SC on February 14, 2006: “The Secretary General's recent report and my own Technical Assessment of 6 January, covering the period up to 15 December, have both made it clear that there was, in the latter part of last year, a noticeable slow-down in the pace of implementation of standards in Kosovo. The most worrying of the slow-downs noted in my Technical Assessment was in the field of minority rights. This is an area where, with the status process now underway, and with the PISG's stance on its outcome being well-known, Kosovo's leaders cannot afford to show anything less than complete commitment, sincerity and action.”


4 UN Security Council Speech, UNMIK SRSG - February 14, 2006: “Standards, as a political priority, cannot be subsumed by status. Symbolic gestures – genuinely important though they are – are not sufficient.”


5 UNHCR relocated over 500 Roma IDP’s in three camps after the destruction of the Mahalla – Cesmin Luge, Kablare (North Mitrovica) and Zitkovac (Zvecan)


6 UNMIK press release 1491. PDSRSG Larry Rossin said: “It is a moral and a political commitment, it should be of Kosovo and it is of the international community, to eventually allow those people to return to their permanent homes.”


7 Mr. Friedrich Schwindt, Director of the Directorate of Organized Crime within UNMIK Police Of course, 02/10/06: ”Especially in Kosovo, sometimes organized crime is intertwined with politics, but is also intertwined with terrorism and with extremism.”


8 Center for International Private Enterprise, Riinvest, etc.


9 February 16, 2006: Principal Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Kosovo (PDSRSG) Larry Rossin promulgated, on behalf of the SRSG, UNMIK Regulation 2006/6 on the Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo. The purpose of this Regulation is to transfer responsibility for the continuing operation of the Ombudsperson Institution to the Assembly of Kosovo



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takatlushja ( shkurt Intelektualja)

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o jap a po shet nojqka a veq ne google po rrin?

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Japani

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Pasha (he) KURANIN nuk i kom marr ne google, po um vijn ne email ka 7 a 8 qesi budallakia ne dite, e do qe mu kan dok interesant ju kom postu. E di qe pritoni me i lexu veq pernime ki**** msu diqka pi tyne edhe pse dini shumė


Ejvalla



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Kaqa

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Japan kogjo fort je tu e majt Topicun, mos lsho pe haver
heheheheheeheh
Qa ki per sot se i kom lexu krejt njeri edhe kish sene te mira,
A ka mundesi me dit prej kujt i merr keto qe te vijn ne email se isha regjistru edhe une njeri,
Serioizsht e kom,


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xenini

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Mua me vjen shumė mirė, qe Japani ėshtė pjes e keti forumi dhe e falenderoj per informata dhe shkrime (mendime) te tine. Disa pjesmares te forumit nuk po e kanė bash n`qejf, dhe pa kurfar arsye po i "gjuhen" nganjehere.


Tung nga xenini.



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Japani

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Spo di Xen, edhe mu po me vjen mir qe jam pjes e forumit, thjesht po argtohna edhe ka ni her po mundohna me ju ofru njerzve diqka, pa ka ni her edhe une si krejt tjert po foli veq me than diqka, ka lloj lloj ktu nuk mujna mi kontrollu, mu nuk ma ndien edhe pse nuk om kan n'qejf se as une si kam ata hahahaha. do t'mundohem qe n'qet topic me shkrujt sene t'mira.

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PSE RUGOVA NUK E DONTE LUFTEN

Ervin Hladnik Milharcic
DELO, Ljubljana

Ne janar te vitit 1990, Ibrahim Rugova ishte ulur ne banesen e tij prej pesedhjete metrash katrore ne Prishtine. "Nuk do ta marr persiper pergjegjesine per dy milione njerezve, per te cilet do me vrase ndergjegjja. Jo, nuk dua" u pati thene Blerim Shales dhe Veton Surrojit, te cilet benin presion mbi te, qe t'i therriste shqiptaret ne kryengritje kombetare.

Disa muaj me pare kishin themeluar bashke Lidhjen Demokratike te Kosoves dhe krahinen e kishin futur ne rrugen e demokracise pluraliste, drejt shtetit te pavarur.

Rugova, nga nje kryetar i Lidhjes se Shkrimtareve te Kosoves, derdhet ne kryetar partiak. Midis ndertesave gri nga cimentoja, nga te cilet dhembnin syte, dhe milicise popullore jugosllave e cila krahinen e shihte si nje arene te krimit, ideja e sapolindur dukej bizare (e cuditshme). Politikisht jorealiste. Dhe nga terminologjia i fundit te viteve te tetedhjeta madje edhe e rrezikshme per shoqerine. Ne ato caste, Rugova kishte rastin qe te behej nje politikan modern i Ballkanit dhe te fillonte luften. Ne vend te kesaj, ai zgjodhi qe ne nje cope te vogel toke, e cila nuk do te guxonte te ishte e rendesishme, te behet politikan i madh. Disa dite me pare ne rruget e Prishtines kishin dale dyqindmije demonstrues dhe kerkonin Republike. Sikur te kerkonte qe ne demonstratat e ardhme te vinin te gjithe, ne Prishtine do vinin dy milione njerez.


Arsyet per kryengritje ishin te shumta.

Kosova e kishte humbur autonomine, qe e kishte si krahine e Jugosllavise socialiste. Ne shenjester ishte vene sistemi i shkollimit ne gjuhen shqipe, i cili ne vitet qe po vijonin ishte reduktuar vetem se ne shkollimin fillor dhe institucionet nacionale po zhdukeshin njera pas tjetres. Ne vend te ketyre, neper rruget e Kosoves po dilnin tanket e Armates Popullore Jugosllave. Shqiptaret te cilet ne vitet e shtatedhjeta dhe te tetedhjeta po shihnin para vetes se tyre mundesine e nje zhvillimi ne popull shtet-formues, e verejten rrugen e cila serish po i shpinte ne nje ruralizem te qytetareve te dores te dyte. Rugoves i ndane statusin e udheheqesit kombetar dhe nga ai po kerkonin qe nga skllaveria t'i shpinte diku tjeter.


Ishte nje kandidat jo i rendomte per nje rol kesisoj. Ne politike kishte ardhur nga letersia. Besonte ne fuqine e fjales. Ishte i bindur, se fjala e arsyes do ta mundte nacionalizmin e cmendur. Ne vitin 1989, Sllobodan Milloshevici ne Gazimestan iu kishte folur dy milione serbeve. Rugova ne kete kohe po bisedonte me nje gazetare te revistes "Der Spiegel". Ai thoshte se ne Kosove do vij deri tek nje lufte e llahtarshme, nese Perendimi nuk do te nderhyje. Por ishte veshtire t'i besohej. Ne te po shihnin vetem nje ekzistencialist me shallin e tij karakteristik dhe cigare, i cili fliste me forcen e fjales. Kur e kishte themeluar partine nuk e dinte mirefilli se kujt do t'i sherbente ajo. Nuk po besonte se partia duhet te veproje si force politike dhe jo si nje institucion i cili vetem se artikulon fjalet. Ne fillim te karrieres se tij, politika ishte vetem dicka, lidhur me te cilen flitet. Ishte nje diletant i mencur. Te bente pershtypjen se nuk e kuptonte se pikerisht mbi supet e tij kishte rene pergjegjesia per ta ndryshuar boten dhe jo qe vetem te flitej per te. Ne castin kur nga ai prisnin vetem se qe te gjente fjalen e pershtatshme per kryengritje, se pari heshti. Dhe pastaj ftoi shqiptaret qe te hiqnin dore nga demonstratat, perkunder faktit se demonstratat ishin menyra e vetme qe ne Kosove te ndodhnin ndryshimet. Mirepo, demonstratat masive, te tere popullit, do te thonin se mbi trupat e popullit do te vozisnin tanket dhe se do te fillonte lufta.

Njerezve, te cilet e shikonin me cudi dhe me nje zhgenjim te madh ia terhiqnin verejtjen, se mbase eshte ky shansi i fundit per nje kryengritje te cilen do ta shihte ndokush, ai u thoshte se perpos konfliktit te hapur ka edhe rruge te tjera dhe nuk ia vlen te futemi ne lufte. Ne nje tubim me pleqnare te fiseve te ndryshme te Kosoves po shpjegonte se kryengritja do te thoshte nje anihilacion i te gjitha ambicieve kombetare dhe se ne vend te saj duhet te pergatitemi ne nje periudhe te gjate te rezistences se qete. Njerezit, te cilet ishin te mesuar te komandonin, dhe jo te degjonin, e degjuan. "Ne jemi te vjeter dhe mendojme me te vjetren" i kishin thene ne fund. "Ti je njeri i ri dhe ti na udheheq".

I udhehoqi neper rrugen e cila dukej rruge e katastrofave. Represioni po rritej per nje dhjetevjetesh te tere. U zhduken te drejtat dhe dukej se shqiptaret e kishin humbur edhe aftesine e te folurit. Ngriten boten e tyre paralele te institucioneve nacionale qe po i gjasonte shume aparteidit. Midis casteve me te tmerrshme, Rugova thoshte se nga ky vend do te lindte nje shtet i ri dhe i pavarur. Fliste me bindjen e nje njeriu, i cili i di punet e vet. Edhe pse jo rralle dukej se ai mbase ishte i vetmi njeri i cili besonte ne kete ceshtje. Me nje shkathtesi te politikanit te kalibrit shume me te madh se vet ia kishte kurdisur kurthin Sllobodan Milloshevicit. Kur ishte percaktuar se nuk do ta fillonte masakren masive, por po persiatej si pacifist te cilin dhuna e ben te vjelle. Fjalimet e tij lidhur me te drejtat e njeriut nuk ishin nje retorike mondane. Barabaresia dhe solidariteti ishin vlera te cilat i respektonte me nje seriozitet skajor. Njekohesisht i bente edhe llogarite e politikanit i cili kishte arritur deri te konkluzioni se pavaresine e Kosoves mund ta garantojne vecse Shtetet e Bashkuara te Amerikes. Kosova ishte nje vend zotit pas shpines dhe jo aq atraktiv per boten. Rugova kishte bere llogarine se ky vend mund te behej qender e interesit pasi per shkak te lojes bizare te rastesive ketu kryqezoheshin interesa fatale. Shkaterrimi i dhunshem i Jugosllavise ishte ne harmoni me frustracionet e Bashkimit Evropian i cili luften ne kontinentin e vet dinte vecse ta vezhgonte. Per krye Kosoves pershkonin frikat nga perhapja e fondamentalizmit islam dhe shpresat e Turqise per nje identitet evropian. Stabilizimi i lindjes dhe ceshtja e zhvillimit te shpejte demokratik te shoqerive te prapambetura ketu po theksoheshin ne menyren me agresive. George Bush plaku per Krishtlindje te vitit 1992, pasi i kishte humbur zgjedhjet, kishte thene, se ky eshte territor amerikan. Serbeve dhe shqiptareve ua kishte terhequr verejtjen se konflikti eventual do te kishte pasoja te renda. Shqiptaret i porositi se SHBA-te nuk do te benin asgje, nese ata do ta fillonin luften. Serbeve ju kishte thene se do t'i sulmonte, nese ata e fillojne luften.

Nuk ishte krejt e qarte, nese mendonte seriozisht dhe a kishin ndonje peshe fjalet e kryetarit i cili sapo kishte humbur zgjedhjet. Mirepo Rugova e kishte marre me seriozitet dhe po i qetesonte kryengritesit per plote tete vjet rresht. Luften e filloi Milloshevici dhe e humbi krahinen, e cila tanime ishte e tij.

Rugova vdiq ne castin kur duhej te fillonin bisedimet se cfare shteti do jete Kosova e pavarur. Zgjati mese pesembedhjete vite, por megjithate ne fund e fitoi lojen. Pas vetes la se paku nje argument, se nuk ka leverdi te fillosh luften. Nuk eshte keq per letrarin, i cili ne politike hyri vetem perkohesisht, perderisa te mos paraqitej kush, i cili merrte vesh ne keto pune.


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Buldozeri" i Pavaresise se Kosoves : Shtetet e Bashkuara te


Amerikes


Pjesa e Parė


 


nga BEQIR SINA, Capitol Hill -Washington D.C


"Status para Standarteve?!" apo "Standarte para Statusit?!".


"Rayburn House Office Building"- Washington D.C.: Pavaresia e Kosoves, ishte tema


kryesore, e cila, dominoje ne te gjitha kendeveshtrimet per me se pese ore, ne nje


debate te "zjarrete" ne Kongresin Amerikan, nga perfaqesuesit e shtetit amerikan,


perfaqesues te Qeverise serbe, perfaqesuesve te Kosoves, dhe te nje institucioni


prestigjoz jo qeveritar amerikan Institutit Amerikan per Paqe. Senaca e degjimit, u


zhvillua dje, ne Capitol Hill - Komitetin per Marredhenie Nderkombetare - te


Kongresit, te Merkuren me 18 Maj 2005. Ne senacen degjimore moren pjese rreth 20


kongresmen amerikan, antare me poste keta, ne Ligjastaturen e 109-te, te Komitetit


per Marredhenie Nderkombetare te Kongresit . Ky degjim nder me te medhat e


mbajtur ndonjeher kohet e fundit, ishte i ndare ne tre panele. Ai filloj me oren 10:30


te mengjesit me kohen e ketueshme, ne 2172 Rayburn House Office Building ne


Washington, dhe perfundoj me oren 13:30 te pasdites


Seanca degjimore kushtuar Pavaresise se Kosoves ose e quajtur ndryshe me gjuhen


diplomatike, Statusi final i Kosoves, ishte i perqendruar ne moton : "Status para


Standarteve" apo "Standarte para Statusit". Ne panelin e pare debatuan ndihmessekretari


amerikan i Shtetit per Ēeshtje politike, Nicholas Burns dhe ish sekretarja e


kandidatit per president zonja Ricardel. Ne panelin e dyte deshmuan Ipeshkvi Mark


Sopi, At Lush Gjergji, Ph.D., Ardian Gjini dhe Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi. Ne panelin e


trete deshmojne ne kete seance, zoti Daniel Serwer zvedespresident dhe Drejtor per


Paqe dhe Stabilitet ne Institutin Amerikan per Paqe, ish Ambasadori grek ne


Washington D.C: Rondos, zedhenesi i presidentit serbo-malazes ne SHBA-s Juriceviq,


prifti katolik nga Beogradi Djordeviq dhe biznesmeni shqiptaro - amerikan


Hajdar(Harry) Bajraktari.


Paneli i Pare:


Ne panelin e pare ne kete seance dy perfaqesuesit e Qeverise amerikane Ndihmessekretari


amerikan i Shtetit per Ēeshtje politike, Nicholas Burns dhe ish sekretarja e


kandidatit per president zonja Ricardel, paraqiten disa nga pikepamjet e Qeverise


amerikane, lidhur me zgjidhjen e statusit te Kosoves. Burns dhe Ricardel gjate


deshmise, shfaqen hapur dhe dhane sinjalet e para, per nje riperteritje te fokusimit


te administrates se Bu**** mbi statusin e ardheshem per Kosoven. ShBA-,s tha Burns


qe ne fillim se do te bashkepunojne ngushte me BE-ne dhe OKB-ne ne procesin e


statusit.


Ndihmes-sekretari amerikan i Shtetit per Ēeshtje politike, Nicholas Burns, i kushtoje


rendesi te veqante asaj se SHBA do te bashkepunoje me BE-ne dhe OKB-ne ne


procesin e statusit, duke e pershkruar ato sikur" jane njera dore dhe SHBA-s dora


tjeter", ne zgjidhjen perfundimtare te statusit final.


Ai tha, se tash duket se koha ka ardhur per negociata mbi statusin final te Kosoves,


pa marre parasysh nje vleresim qe pritet te behet nga Kombet e Bashkuara, rreth


progresit te shenuar drejt normave demokratike. Ai tha se statusi aktualisht i


papercaktuar i Kosoves, nuk eshte me i pranueshem.


"Kosova, eshte ndoshta Ēeshtja me e veshtire qe mbetet per t'u zgjidhur ne rajon.


Ne besojme se status quo-ja e statusit te papercaktuar te Kosoves, eshte e


paqendrueshme, e padeshirueshme dhe e papranueshme. Nuk kenaq asnje nga palet


dhe asnje nga rajoni," tha Burns. Por edhe nese standardet e permendura me siper


kane perparuar sa duhet apo jo, ne mendojme se Kosova eshte pjekur per


negociata. Sipas tij, Kombet e Bashkuara pritet te bejne me vone kete vit vleresimin


e permbushjes se standardeve te percaktuara nga bashkesia nderkombetare, ne


veĒanti perkushtimin per mbrojtjen e te drejtave te pakices serbe.


Por edhe nese standardet e permendura me siper kane perparuar sa duhet apo jo,


ne mendojme se Kosova eshte pjekur per negociata. Nese ky vleresim eshte pozitiv,


dhe ne kemi besimin se do te jete pozitiv, atehere ne do t'i kerkojme Kofi Ananit te


caktoje nje zyrtar te larte evropian ne vjeshte i ndihmuar ky edhe nga nje diplomat i


larte amerikan qe do te caktohet nga presidenti Bush per te kryer bisedime per


statusin perfundimtar," tha Burns.


"Ne duhet te perfundojme punen per sheshimin e konflikteve qe nuk i ka lejuar


vendet e Ballkanit te shenojne perparim politik dhe ekonomik ashtu si fqinjet e tyre.


Ne dhe aleatet po hyjme ne nje faze te re ne politiken tone ndaj Ballkanit, nje faze


qe synon te pershpejtoje integrimin e ketij rajoni ne familjen evropiane dhe


institucionet euro-atlantike. Sekretarja Rajs, tha zoti Burns, me ka kerkuar te shkoj


ne Serbi, Mal te Zi dhe Kosove si dhe ne Bosnje ne fillim te muajit te ardhshem per


te ritheksuar angazhimin e Shteteve te Bashkuara per te ndihmuar ne zgjidhjen e


problemeve te rajonit si dhe per te nxitur udheheqesit vendore te bejne perparim me


te madh ne ne Ēeshtjet e pazgjidhura," tha nensekretari amerikan i shtetit.


Burns tha se nuk do te jete e lehte te arrihet nje marreveshje lidhur me statusin e


ardhshem te Kosoves. Beogradi ka paraqitur poziten e tij ku kerkon qe Kosoves


tā€™i njihet me shume se autonomia, por me pak se pavaresia. Popullsia shqiptare e


Kosoves kembengul per pavaresi te menjehershme dhe pa kushte. Gjetja e nje


kompromisi ndermjet ketyre qendrimeve do te jete nje sfide e veshtire.


Burns tha se Shtetet e Bashkuara mendojne se procesi duhet te udhehiqet nga nje


figure e larte politike evropiane, e emeruar nga OKB-ja ne konsultim me Grupin e


Kontaktit. Shtetet e Bashkuara, tha ai, do te ofrojne nje diplomat te larte amerikan si


zevendes te tij dhe sekretarja e shtetit Rice po shqyrton kandidaturat e mundeshme


per kete post.


 



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Buldozeri" i Pavaresise se Kosoves : Shtetet e Bashkuara te Amerikes


Pjesa e Dytė


 Roli i Beogradit ne kete proces, theksoi nenskretari amerikan i shtetit, duhet te jete angazhimi i vazhdueshem dhe konstruktiv. Ƈdo vonese e panevojshme ose pengese do te na bente te rishikonim rolin e Beogradit. "Ne, tha zoti Burns, i bejme thirje Beogradit te mbeshtese serbet e Kosoves per tā€™u kthyer ne Parlament dhe per te


rifilluar pjesemarrjen e tyre ne institucionet dhe jeten politike ne Kosove, duhe i dhene fund izolimit te imponuar nga Beogradi". Cilido qofte statusi perfundimtar i Kosoves, Beogradit do tā€™i duhet te pranoje ndryshime krahasuar me situaten para vitit 1999. Procesi per percaktimin e statusit perfundimtar te Kosoves u jep mundesi Shteteve te Bashkuara te ndihmojne Serbine te kthehet ne gjirin e Evropes ku i takon te jete, tha nensekretari amerikan i shtetit Nik Burns ish ambasadori i SHBAve ne Athine, aktulishte perfaqesuesi zyrtar i Qeverise amerikane, ndihmes-sekretari


amerikan i Shtetit per Ēeshtje politike. Paneli i Dyte :


Ipeshkvi i Ipeshkvise se Kosoves, Imzot Mark Sopi, gjate deshmise ne Kongresin Amerikan, tha se Shikoni, lufta ne Kosove eshte e paparnueshme te quhet lufte fetare. Ajo tha ai nuk ka qene as lufte nderetnike dhe as fetare, por ka qene diĒka me teper, qe do te thote, politike. Politike, sepse edhe populli i Kosoves, si Ēdo popull tjeter, deshiron te kete liri, si popujt e tjere, te jetoje dhe te veproje ne liri. Ngaqe e ka deshiruar kete, ka arritur deri ne konflikt. Per nje lufte fetare kurrsesi nuk mund te flitet, pasi nuk ka patur diĒka te tille, per te cilen do te kishim aluduar se ka qene lufte fetare. Keshtu qe u shpreh Imzot Mark Sopi , Pavaresia e Kosoves eshte solucioni qe prodhon vetem paqe e siguri jo vetem per Kosoven, por per rajonin dhe mbare Evrope, e boten Dr.don Lush Gjergji nga Kosova, prifti katolik shqiptar, zv/Ipeshkvise Shkup-Prizren, e filloje deshmin e tij ne kete seance degjimore, duke treguar origjinen e Nene


Terezes, dhe mbi shkrimet etija reth biografise se saj. Ndertetjera ai tha se :"Nga historia dhe eksperienca jo rastesishte tek shqiptaret lindi dhe doli e Lumja Nena Tereze Bojaxhiu, e cila, nga pervoja familjare, famillitare, fetare dhe kombetare e kuptoi univesalizimin, plularizmin, bashkimin ne dallime, dhe fuqine e fese dhe frymezimin e dashurise tejkalonte Ēdo kufi dhe ndasi ne mbare boten. Kosova, si model bashkepunimi, bashkejetese, dialogu, faljeje, pajtimi, eshte sfide e jona por edhe e miqeve tane, pra e gjithe atyre qe jane ne Kosove per te miren e perbashket. Me zemer falemderoje kryetarin Hyde, kongresmenin Lantos, e Rohabarcher, dhe te gjithe antaret e tjere per vemendjen. Zoti ju bekofte! Zoti e


bekofte Ameriken! dhe Zoti i bekofte te gjithe njerezit e Kosoves dhe botes, perfundoj fjalen e tij Don Lush Gjergji PhD Parson and Vicar General - Catholic Church.  Perfaqesuesi i Qeverise se Kosoves, Ministri i Mjedisit dhe Planifikimit Hapesinor, z. Ardian Gjini, tha se eshte nje pervilegje e madhe dhe krenari te deshmoje para Kongresit Amerikan. Vendi im Kosova, i gjithe populli i saj paguan mirenjohjen e larte dhe respektin per Shtetet e Bashkuara te Amerikes, per demokracine amerikane dhe popullin e saj. Nesaj te rolit dhe kontributit tuaj ne kemi zhvilluar zgjedhje demokratike te cilat kane qene model ne rajon si te lira, te drejta, e te ndershme. Te njohura keto nga te gjitha partite dhe nga te gjithe vezhguesit ndekombetar.


Shirli Cloyes - DioGuardi keshilltare e Ēeshtjeve Ballkanike prane Lidhjes Qytetare Shqiptaro- Amerikane, e fokusoj deshmin e saj tek vitaliteti i intereseva te SHBA-ve, ne Ballkan. Ɖshte ne interes vital te SHBA-ve, te tregojne se me te vertet


mbeshtesin demokratizmin e te gjithe shoqerise, ne ato vende qe dolen nga rregjimi komuniste dhe ultranacionaliste. Interesat vitale te SHBA-ve jane tek progresiviteti i popullit shqiptar ne zemer te Evropes. Gjithashtu eshte ne interes te SHBA-s, te mbeshtes lirine dhe zhvillimiet demokratike ne Shqiperi. E cila ka nje popull nga me pro-perendimor, pro -amerikan nga te gjithe popujt e JugLindjes se Evropes. Kjo tha ajo u deshmua edhe pas ngjarjve te 11 shtatorit 2001 edhe ne koalicion nderkombetar kundra terrorizmit. Kur shume serbe, sllavo maqedonas, greker dhe


ruse vallezonin rrugeve te kryeqyteteve te tyre, shqiptaret derdhinin lote e luteshin me qirinje duke thene "We are with you"


Paneli i Trete:


Ne panelin e trete qe deshmoje ne kete seance, i pari e mori fjalen zoti Daniel Serwer zvedespresident dhe Drejtor per Paqe dhe Stabilitet ne Institutin Amerikan per Paqe. Ambasadori grek Rondos, i akuzoje rende shqiptaret, si te vetemit,


nacionalista ekstremiste ne Ballkan. Ai hodhi pyetjen se nese do te dish se ku ka nacionalizem ekstrem?" ate e gjene vetem tek kombi shqiptare" thote greku Rondos. Zedhenesi i presidentit serbo-malazes ne SHBA-s Juriceviq, tha se Serbia, nuk eshte me ajo e Millosheviqit. Serbia, sipas tij eshte nje vend demokratik qe ka shume mundesi Kosoves t'i jape autonomin edhe me shume te drejta. Prifti katolik nga Beogradi Djordeviq, u ankua se shqiptaret e Kosoves, kane djegur Kishat serbe gjate trazirave te vitit te kaluar.


Kongresmeni Robert Wexler, tha se, ne Beograde, ai ka pare dy qendrime krejt te ndryshme per Kosoven. Ai tha se sapo ishte kthyer nga nje vizite qe i kishte bere Beogradit, dhe se kishte vrejtur atje gjate takimeve, qe ndryshe te ishin mendimet e Tadiqit, dhe krejt ndryshe ato te Koushtunices. Ne kete mynyre, tha ai pyetja, eshte: se kujt duhet besuar ne zjgidhjen e kesaj Ēeshteje?. Lantosh e pershkroj ne detaje rrugen e sigurte qe po ndjek Kosova tani, per te merituar ashtu si shume vende te tjera te botes, shume me te vogla se sa Kosova, pavaresine. Dana Rohrabacher , i


hodhi poshte me argumenta dhe fakte te pakundershtueshme deshmine e ambasadorit greke Rondos, zedhenesit te presidentit serbo-malazes ne SHBA-s Juriceviq, dhe te priftit nga Beogradi, Djordeviq. Kongresmeni Rohrabacher, pyeti ata se :"Kush e ka sulmuar me deri tani Serbine, me tanke, ushtri dhe djegeje e shkaterrime, siĒ i ka sulmuar Serbia, Koroacine, Bosnje Hercegnovin dhe se fundi Kosoven? . Rohrabacher, eshte i mendimit se SHBA- kampioni i lirise e demokracise, nuk duhet kurresesi te marrin mesime se si jepet liria e demokracia popujve te tjere, por duhet t'u servirin atyre modelet amerikane te demokracise e lirise. Eliot Engel, u kerkoj me kembengulje serbeve qe ata t'a njohen te paret pavarsine e Kosoves, sepse kjo Ēeshtje tregon se me te vertet serbia deshiron te futet ne familjen Evropiane. Te behet antare e NATO-s, e Bashkimit Evropian dhe mike e SHBA-ve. Dhe se pavarsia e Kosoves eshte ne te


miren e vete serbise. Biznesmeni i sukseseshem shqiptaro - amerikan Hajdar(Harry) Bajraktari, antar i


Keshillit Kombetar Shqiptaro - Amerikan, tha se Kosova, eshte nje vend pa ekonomi stabile. Ne termin e GDP- per njeri, Kosova, ka nje ekonomi me te varfer ne Ballkan. Mbi 37% e popullsise klasifikohet e varfer. Me nje pages ditore me me pak se sa 1.42 euro ne dite. Dhe 15 % e tyre jane nen nivelin e varferise me 0,93 euro ne dite. Problemi i privatizmit, tha ai eshte me teper nje Ēeshtje politike se sa ekonomike. Gjate 8 muajve te kaluar une dhe partneri ime(Rustem Geci) kemi investuar ne Kosove ne kater biznese dhe nga eksperienca kemi pare se atje ka shume burokraci. Pavarasia, definitivisht, tha Bajraktari, eshte termi qe do te rise fuqine ekonomike, jep progres dhe e lidh Kosoven me te gjitha institucionet  onetare e finacire nderkombetare ne bote.



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KOSOVA, ĒKA QENĖ, Ē’ĖSHTĖ E Ē’DO TĖ BĖHET DHE SI DO TĖ BĖHET


Nė qoftė se synimi shqiptar nė Kosovė ėshtė qė Kosova tė jetė njė shtet i pavarur,


atėherė kjo nuk mund tė arrihet pėr pa u formėsuar kosovarėt si komb. Kushtet


ekzistuese pas okupimit tė saj nga ushtritė e NATO-s janė ideale pėr kėtė. Vetėm


se duhet ditur tė shfrytėzohen.


Pikėrisht para 100 vjetėsh, ideologu kombėtar shqiptar Sami Frashėri [1850-1904] ka shkruar tė vetmin program kombėtar qė posedojnė shqiptarėt: “Shqipėria ē’ka qenė, ē’ėshtė dhe ē’do tė bėhet”. Programi i Samiut ishte njė analizė e shkėlqyeshme e sė kaluarės dhe sitautės sė atėhershme aktuale shqiptare. Fakti se ky program nuk arriti tė realizohet nė tėrėsi flet pėr mangėsi tė tij. Mangėsia kryesore e kėtijė programi ishte fakti se Samiu shpjegonte se si mund dhe duhėt tė jetė Shqipėria, por jo edhe si tė bėhet njė Shqipėri e tillė. Edhe pse i mangėt si program, drafti i Samiut paraqet njė bazė filozofike pėr kombin shqiptar vijat e sė cilės filozofi janė tė dukshme nė tėrė


historinė moderne shqiptare 100- vjeqare. Por jo vetėm mangėsitė e kėtijė programi por edhe rrethanat tjera bėn qė populli [etnia] shqiptar tė mos krijojė njė komb tė vetėm.


Sado qė pjesa e popullit [etnisė] shqiptar qė mbeti jashtė kufijve tė shtetit shqiptar tė vitit 1913 u pėrpoq ta injorojė si fakt lėnien jashtė kufirit shtetėror gjatė gjithė kėsaj kohe dhe ta kuptojė tė qenėt jashtė kufijve vetėm si okupim tė pėrkohshėm, zgjatja e madhe e kėsaj “pėrkohėsie” bėri qė tė krijohen themelet edhe pėr njė komb tjetėr nga


gjiri i popullit shqiptar, pra themelet e kombit kosovar. Kjo nuk ėshtė aspak e habitshme pėr ata qė e kuptojnė se pėr dallim nga populli [etnia] qė ėshtė fakt fizik, kombi ėshtė njė rezultat politik.


Derisa populli [etnia] ėshtė njė bashkėsi njerėzish qė kanė gjuhė tė pėrbashkėt, kulturė tė pėrbashkėt dhe jetojnė nė njė territor kompakt jo domosdoshmėrisht tė organizuar nė shoqėri, kombi ėshtė mė tepėr se kaq, ėshtė shoqėri e aftė pėr tė krijuar shtet dhe jo domosdoshmėrisht nė baza etnike.


Kėshtu pėr shembull kemi kombin amerikan apo atė kanadez ose australian qė ėshtė ndėrtuar mbi bazėn e shumė popujve [etnive]. Nė anėn tjetėr kemi kombin polak qė ėshtė ndėrtuar mbi bazėn e popullit [etnisė] polak dhe natyrisht shumė e shumė raste tė tjera ku kombi ėshtė ndėrtuar mbi bazėn e njė populli [etnie].


Jo tė pakta janė rastet kur mbi bazėn e njė populli [etnie] janė ndėrtuar dy apo mė shumė kombe. Kėtu kemi popullin rumun [ kombi rumun + kombi moldav], popullin [etninė] serb [kombi serb + kombi malazez], popullin [etninė] malaj [kombi malajzian + kombi indonezian], popullin [etninė] bullgar [ kombi bullgar + kombi maqedon], popullin [ etninė] grek [ kombi grek + kombi qipriot], etj. Po ashtu kemi rastin kur mbi bazėn e njė populli [etnie] janė formuar shumė kombe siē ėshtė rasti gjerman [ kombi gjerman + kombi austriak + kombi zviceran + kombi


luksemburgian etj] apo edhe ai arab ku mbi bazėn e njė populli [etnie] janė formuar shumė kombe [egjiptianėt, tunizianėt, libianėt, algjerianėt, marokenet, irakianet, jemenėt, sirianėt, jordanezėt, libanezėt, palestinezėt etj.].


SHQIPTARĖT SI MALAJĖT DHE BULLGARĖT


Duke iu kthyer ēėshtjes shqiptare gjejmė analogji tė shumta nėpėr botė. P.sh. populli malaj nuk ka krijuar kombe vetėm pse “iu tek ashtu”. Njė pjesė e vendit tė malajve ishte pushtuar nga Anglia, kurse pjesa tjetėr mga Holanda. Populli malaj si nė Malajzi si nė Indonezi pėrdor tė njejtėn gjuhė, ka tė njejtėn kulturė, tė njejtėn fe [myslimane]


dhe jetojnė nė njė territor kompakt, por ata I dallon infrastruktura politike . kėshtu Malajzia 20 milionėshe si ish-koloni e Angėlisė ėshtė njė ndėr vendet mė tė zhvilluara tė Azisė, kurse ish-kolonia holandeze Indonezia, edhe pse 200 milionėshe, ėshtė njė ndėr shtetet mė tė pazhvilluara tė Azisė. Kėshtu malajzianėt dhe indonezianėt edhe pse


kanė marrėdhėnie shumė tė mira ndėrmjet veti, konsiderohen si kombe tė veēanta. Rasti mė analog ėshtė me bullgar. Mė 1878 kur Bullgaria fitoi autonominė e saj nėn Perandorinė Osmane, pjesa mė e madhe e popullit mbeti jashtė kufijvė tė Bullgarisė. Klasa e atėhershmė politike bullgare filloi qė nė mėnyrė parėsore tė merrej me


problemer e Bullgarisė brenda kufijve dhe problemet e Bullgarisė jashtė kufijve t’I shilojė mė me nge. Si rezultat I kėsaj politike, sinonim I sė cilės ishte regjenti dhe kryeministri I atėhershėm Stefan Stambullov [ 1854 – 1895], Bullgaria u zgjerua edhe me Thrakinė Perėndimore, por jo edhe me Maqedoninė. Bullgaėt e mbetur jashtė


kufijve shtetėror pėrbėnin pjesėn mė agresive tė nacionalizmit bullgar aq sa edhe u krijua parulla se Bullgariae vėrtet ėshtė Maqedonia dhe jo territori ku shtriheh shteti I atėhershėm bullgar. Dy politikanėt dhe kryeministri mė tė shquar qė ka nxjerr historia bullgare : Stefan Stambullov dhe Aleksandėr Stambolinski janė vrarė pikėrisht nga


nacionalistėt bullgar [ magedonas] pėr shkak se “nuk janė angazhuar pėr bashkimin e Maqedonisė me vendin amė Bullgarinė”. Madje kur e kanė vrarė Aleksandėr Stambolinksin [ viti 1923] I kanė prerė dorėn me tė cilėn ai si kryeministėr I Bullgarisė ka nėnshkruar marrėveshje bashkėpunimi me Qeverinė serbe, e cila ėshtė ekspozuar si


kėrcėnim pėr tė gjithė ata qė do “harrojnė se Maqedonia ėshtė pjesė e Bullgarisė”.


Mirėpo, fati historik I popullit bullgar bėri qė populli I Maqedonisė tė formėsohet si komb me vete duke shkuar aq larg sa edhe tė mohojė ēdo lidhje me bullgarėt qoftė edhe ato etnike, gjuhesore e fetare.


KOMBI KOSOVAR NĖ KRIJIM E SIPĖR


Shqiptarėt e Kosovės nuk duhet ta bėjnė njė mohim tė tillė ndaj Shqipėrisė dhe historisė shqiptare siē vepraun bullgarėt e Maqedonisė, por duhet ta kuptojnė se Kosova ka nevoj pėėr njė infrastruktuė politike mė tė lartė e mė cilėsore se atė qė ka Shqipėria dhe njėkohėsisht tė punojnė e tė luftojnė pėr kėtė. Kosova nuk ka nevojė pėr


njė gjuhė dhe njė alfabet tė ri siē bėnė bullgarėt e Maqedonisė, por sidoqoftė kjo nuk do tė thotė qė kosovarėt tė mos I kushtojnė kultivimit tė gjuhės shqipe ėrndėsi mė tė madhe se ajo qė I kushtohet nė Tiranė. Nėse nė Tiranė lejojnė tė futen greqizma, sllavizma, italianizma, kjo nuk ėshtė e thėnė qė kjo tė lejohet edhe nė Kosovė. Dhe


nėse pėr kėtė nuk gjendet mirėkuptim nė Tiranė nuk ka gjė tė keqe tė pėrdoret termi “varianti kosovar I shqipes sė standatdizuar”. Tek e fundit kemi tri variante tė anglishtes standarde [britanike, amerikane, australiane] dhe mund t’I kemi edhe 2-3 variante tė shqipės standarde po qė do tė jetė nevoja. Nė vijim tė kėtij shkrimi po jap


disa vija tė domosdoshme themelore tė cilat do tė duhej t’I kishim parasysh.


ĒĖSHTJE TĖ STRATEGJISĖ


E para. Nėse synimi shqiptar nė Kosovė ėshtė qė Kosova tė jetė njė shtet i pavarur atėherė kjo nuk mund tė arrihet  pėr pa u formėsuar kosovarėt si komb. Kushtet ekzistuese nė Kosovė pas okupimit tė saj nga ana e ushtrive tė NATO-sė janė ideale pėr kėtė. Vetėm se duhet ditur tė shfrytezohen. Pėr kėtė qėllim nė interesin e Kosovės


e Shqipėrisė, nė interesin e shqiptarėve tė Maqedonisė dhe pėrgjithėsisht nė interesin e shqiptarėve si popull kudo qė janė sa mė kooperativ me forcat ndėrkombėtare nė Kosovė. Por, jo tė jenė servile ndaj tyre. Fatkeqėsisht, aktualisht nė Kosovė qasja politike ndaj organizmave ndėrkombėtarė nė Kosovė po zhvillohet nė dy drejtime


shumė tė rrezikshmė pėr prespektivėn e Kosovės. Njėra ėshtė servilizmi ndėrsa tjetri ėshtė qasja armiiiqėsore apo mė mirė tė themi karshillėku ndaj organizmave ndėrkombėtarė qė veprojnė nė Kosovė . Qė tė dyja kėto janė fatale pėr ardhmėrinė e  Kosovės. Pėr t’iu shmangur kėsaj ėshtė e nevojshme qė Kosova dhe kosovarėt tė


krijojnė njė strategji e cila do ti ēoj nga pavarsia e Kosovės dhe qė nuk do tė bjerė 0ndesh me interesat e Perėndimit, nė radhė tė parė atyre amerikanė, nė Kosovė. Pasja e njė strategji tė qartė e tė kuptueshme pėr Perėndimin ēon nga ajo qė Perėndimi nė tė gjitha pazaret rreth Kosovės tė anoj kah interesat e Kosovės .


E dyta. Nė ēdo strategji eknomike duhet pėrkrahur klasa e mesme e shoqėrisė sepse ajo pėrbėn shtyllėn kurrizore tė ēdo shoqėrie. Forcimi i kėsaj klase do tė thot forcim I kombit kosovar dhe pėrkrahje e interesave strategjike tė Kosovės. Nė kėtė kontekst, prioritet do dhėnė zhvillimit tė fshatrave sepse niveli i zhvillimit tė fshatit paraqet


nivelin e zhvillimit tė njė shoqėrie. Nė shumė shtete afrikane apo latino-amerikane ka klaasė pasanikėsh pasuria e tė cilėve ėshtė pakrahasimisht mė e madhe se e pasanikėve tė Evropės Perėndimorė, por megjithkėtė kėto vende jan tė pazhvilluara dhe larg realizimit tė tyre si komb. Kjo ėshtė kėshtu sepse pėr dallim nga arti ky niveli i cilėsisė


matet me shpejtėsin e anijės sė parė nė flotė, niveli i zhvillimit tė shoqėrisė matet me shpejtėsinė e anijės sė fundit nė flotė. Hapi i parė duhet tė ndėrrmirret nė kėtė drejtim ėshtė shpėrndarja e institucioneve qendrore nėpėr mbarė Kosovėn. P.sh. Ministria e Tregtisė do tė mund tė vendosej nė Pejė, Ministria e Mbrojtjes nė Skėnderaj, Ministria


e Turizmit nė Dragash, Ministria e Industrisė nė Mitrovicė, Ministria e Transporteve nė Ferizaj, Ministria e Rendit nė Vushtrri, Ministria e Kulturės nė Prizren, Ministria e Jashtme nė Gjakovė, Ministria e Financave nė Gjilan, Ministria e Sporteve nė Leposaviq, etj. Po kėshtu do tė mund tė shpėrndaheshin edhe institucionet e tjera


qendrore. P.sh. Instituti i Historisė mund tė vendosej nė Prizren, Instituti Albanologjik nė Gllogoc, ndonjė institut nė Podujevė, Klinė, Rahovec etj. Njė shpėrndarje e tillė nuk do tė paraqiste problem teknin pėr vend tė vogėl siē ėshtė Kosova. Pos tjerash do tė pėrshpejtonte iniciativat dhe hapat pėr meremetimin dhe zgjerimin e rrugėve ndėrurbane nė Kosovė. Nėse kjo nuk pėrbėn problem teknik pėr njė shtet tė madhė siē ėshtė Suedia pėrse tė pėrbėj pėr Kosovėn, sė cilės pėr tri-katėr orė mund t’I sillėsh rreth e pėrēark me veturė. Koncentrimi i institucioneve vetėm nė kryeqytet ka efekt psikologjik dhe bėn qė tė ngushtohet shpirti i kombit nė formim e sipėr. Nga ana  tjetėr shpėrndarja e institucioneve anembanė Kosovės do ta zhvillonte Kosovėn nė mėnyrė tė balancuar, do tė forconte klasėn e mesme dhe fshatarėsinė dhe me njė fjalė do ta shprehte shpirtin e madh kombėtar tė Kosovės.


E treta. Simbolet dhe terminologjia. Kosova sa mė parė duhet tė krijojė simbolet e veta dalluese, flamurin, stemėn, himnin, dhe ditėn kombėtarė. Do tė ishte e rrugės qė kėto ti bėjmė vetė se sa tė na i caktojė Kushneri apo ai qė do tė vijė pas tij. Ēėshtja e simboleve kombėtare tė Kosovės do tė duhej tė vendosej pas njė debati tė gjerė demokratik. Do tė ishte mirė qė flamuri i Kosovės tė mos dallonte thelbėsisht nga ai I Shqipėrisė. Shqiponja e zezė me kraahė tė hapur nė sfondin e kuq do tė duhej tė ishte patjetėr nė flamurin e Kosovės. Dimensionet mund tė jenė tė ndryshme nga ai I Shqipėrisė. P.sh. pėr dallim nga flamuri i Shqipėrisė qė ka formėn drejtkėndėshe,


flamuri i Kosovės mund tė kishte formėn katrore. Stema e Kosovės do tė mund tė ishte njėsoj si ajo e Shqipėrisė vetėm mbi shqiponjė tė jetė e shkruar me germa tė zeza fjala KOSOVA [zaten kjo veē po pėrdorėt nė mėnyrė  joformale aktualisht si dekor nėpėr vetura]. Hymni i Kosovės do tė mund t’ishte kompozimi i Rexho Mulliqit “Kur ra kushtrimi n’Kosovė” apo melodi tjetėr pėr tė cilėn do tė shpallej konkurs i posaēėm. Dita kombėtare e Kosovės do tė mund tė ishte 10 qėrshori. Kjo ėshtė dita e Lidhjes sė Prizrenit e po ashtu dita e kapitullimit tė forcave sėrbe nė Kosovė. Natyrisht 28 Nėntori po ashtu mund tė kremtohet si ditė feste nė Kosovė. Kosova po ashtu duhet t’i


veēoj figurat e veta historike nga ku ėshtė krijuar boshti i ideologjisė kombėtare tė Kosovės. Pa dyshim se kėto figura janė; Ymer Prizreni, Haxhi Zeka, Hasan Prishtina, Xhafer Deva e familja Jashari. Sa i pėrket terminologjisė, duhet pasur kujdes qė tė mos bijmė ndesh me objektivin pėr pavarėsinė e Kosovės. P.sh. Pėrdorimi i termit “Shteti amė”, “Vendi amė”, pėr Shqipėrinė qė bjen ndesh me pavarėsinė e Kosovės, sepse vetėm pakicat kombėtare


kanė “shtete amė”. Ndėrsa kombet kanė “shtete vėlla”, “shtete motėr” etj. por jo “shtete amė”. Terminologjia, po ashtu ėshtė snjė ēėshtje qė duhet t’u inponohet organizmave ndėrkombėtarė nė Kosovė. Kur flitet pėr terminologjinė nėnkuptohet se fjalė ėshtė pėr pėrdorimin e toponimeve tė Kosovės nė gjuhėn angleze. Tani qė po


pėrgatitet dhe ku ekspertėt vendas meodoemos duhet tė konsultohen, dehet  meodoemos qė tė insistohet qė nė dokumentet zyrtare nė anglisht tė futet termi “Kosova” e jo “Kosovo”. Nė rast, kjo nuk merret parasysh dhe dokumentet nė gjuhėn angleze [letėrnjoftimet, pasaportat etj.] lėshohen me “Kosovo”. Ata qė bartin kartela tė


tilla duhet tė dėnohen nga opinoni njėsoj si atė qė e ka emrin Sokol e lejon ta quajnė Stojan. Nė kėtė rrafsh, me rėndėsi ėshtė se si deklarohen qytetarėt e Kosovės nė CV, nė pyetėsorė dhe formularė tė ndryshėm. Nė vendin ku shkraun: “ Shteti i lindjes” duhet tė plotėsohet me “Kosova”. Aty ku shkruan “Kombėsia” [“Nationality”] duhet


plotėsuar me “kosovarė”. Aty ku shkruan pėrkatėsia etnike [ethnicity] duhet plotėsua me “albanian”. Pastaj “gjuha amėtare” me “Albanian” etj.


KOHA DITORE”



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O njeri meso me shkru bre e pastaj hape teme te diskutimeve. Cka thone analistat.
Sqarim Anal( zuze) list (lepires).

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Po ti ja paske gjet emrin vetes katastrof.


Une tipi nuk i shkruj kto sene, po i marr edhe i postoj etu, i marr krejt ato qe m'duken t'mira tip, e ti ndaq mi lexu lexoj e mos daq lej.


Edhe mos mu bani bre shum letrar se skeni nevoj, e rendesishme osht mi kuptu konceptin e shkrimit e jo mu marr me detale kishe une jam ma i meqem.


hajt mos ta nin se prap ka me qit qasi artikuj e do pi tyne besa edhe me gabime drejtshkrimore (ti duhesh me than shyqyr qe po dalinn njerez i pi perkthejn artikujt e ti pi lexon t'gatshem, mos ja nxerr funin oj katastrof



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Enver HASANI, PhD 
Profesor i sė Drejtės dhe i Marrdhėnieve Ndėrkombėtare  
 
"Lehtėsia e Padurueshme e Debatit mbi Ndėrrimin e Simboleve Nacionale"  
25 dhjetor 2002 / Dr. Enver HASANI  
 


Llojet e nacionalzmave dhe simbolet nacionale


Ėshtė vėshtirė tė thuhet mė saktėsi se kur ka lindur kėrkesa pėr ndryhsim tė identitetit tonė. Njė gjė, megjithatė, ėshtė e sigurtė: presionet pėr ndryshim tė identitetit tonė, pėrmes ndryshimit tė simboleve kryesore nacionale, kanė filluar atherė kur ėshtė parė qartė se nuk ka qenė i mundur realizimi i projekteve, kryesisht serbe, pėr shfarosjen tonė en masse. Ky problem lidhet me trendet e pėrgjithshme tė formimit tė kombit ne Evropė dhe nė mė gjėrė.  
Sikundėr dihet, gjatė shekullit tė 19-tė janė kristalizuar dy koncpte pėr kombin: njė mbi kombin-shtet dhe tjetri mbi kombin-kulturė. Ky i pari ka rrėnjet nė traditen nacionale franceze dhe mė vonė ėshtė pranuar nga pjesa dėrrmuese e botės, kurse ky i dyti ėshtė me rrėnjė nga tradita gjermane e kombformimit dhe ka hasur nė pėrkrahje mė tė kufizuar. Kombi-kulturė ka lindur mė vonė dhe ate nė ato vende ku formimi i shtetit nuk ka koinciduar me etnicitetin e themeluseve tė shtetit tė tillė. Kjo gjendje, sipas definicionit, ka paraqitur problem real nė marrdhėniet ndėrkombetare. Nė fakt, krejt historia e Evropės, qė nga kjo kohė, ka konsistuar nė pėrpjekjet e vazhdueshme pėr realizimin e kėrkesave pėr vetėvendosje tė miliona njerėzve, pėrkatėsisht tė kombeve tė shumtė tė mbetur jasht kufijve tė shteteve tė tyre. Ky ka qenė rregulli, nė ndėrkohė qė kėrkesat e tilla kanė pasur tė bėjnė, jo rrallė, me kombet qė nuk arritėn, as sot e kėsaj dite, tė krijojnė njė copė shtet shtet nė kėtė planetė.  
Sikundėr u cek, versioni francez ka diminuar dhe dominon sot nė botė, ndėrkaq pqrhapja ėshtė e tij ėshtė bėrė pėrmes procesit tė kolonizimit, kryesisht gjatė shekullit 19tė. Nė kontekstin ballkanik ky proces ėshtė zhvilluar pėrmes Luftėrave Ballkanike (1912-1913), duke u shoqėruar me dhunė tė paparė pėr asrye se Ballkani nuk ka qenė si Franca nė pikėpamje tė pėrbėrjes etnike dhe tė nivelit kulturor e edukativ. Kjo nuk don koment. Serbėt kanė pranuar traditėn franceze dhe e kanė zbatuar nė Ballakn. Natyrisht qė ata nuk patėn kurrė njė personalitet tė profilit tė Monteskijes pėr tė sqaruar zbatimin korrekt tė nacionalizmit qė ka formėn e "Frymės sė Ligjeve". Serbėt synuan zbatimin e versionit francez tė nacionalizmit pėr arsye se shumica e elites serbe tė asaj kohe qe edukuar dhe ndikuar nga tradita nacionaliste franceze.  
Mbi kėtė bazė edhe janė bėrė projektet nacionaliste serbe pėr shfarosjen e popujve joserb, qė nga Garashanini (1844) e kėndej. Kjo nuk don tė thotė se nė pėrpilimin e kėtyre projekteve serbe nuk kanė pasur ndikim kulturat tjera, sic ėshtė ajo gjermane apo austriake. Mirėpo, ėshtė fakt se ideja kryesore e shtetsisė sėrbe ishte dhe mbeti kopjim i tradites, teorisė dhe praktikės franceze, e vėn nė jetė nga ana e njė populli me njė strukturė sociale kryesisht rurale dhe me njė nivel tė ulėt politik, kulturor dhe arsimor. Kėto projekte nacionaliste, megjithatė, janė realizuar me pak a shume sukses deri nė mbarim tė Luftės sė Dytė Botėrore. Pėr dallim nga francezėt, serbėt nuk qenė kurrė superiorė ndaj atyre qė i pushtuan. Kjo rrethanė i ka detyruar serbėt qė tė ushtrojnė dhunė brutale dhe tė pėrdorin metodat dhe mjetet mė antihumane pėr "asimilimin" e kulturave dhe popujve joserb.  
Futja e ish Jugoslavisė nėn orbitėn komuniste ka shėnuar njė fazė tė re nė marrdhėniet ndėrnacionale. Pėr dallim nga Bashkimi Sovjetik dhe Stalini, nė ish Jugosllavi nuk ka qenė i mundur zbatimi rigoroz i teorisė dhe praktikės nacionale tė Stalinit mbi dėbiminm masiv tė kombeve tė "padėshirueshme". Pėrvec faktorit tė brendshėm (rivaliteti konstant serbo-kroat), vendi evropian i ish Jugoslavisė, njė tanimė paqqėsor krahasuar mė periudhėn para Luftės sė Dytė Botėrore, duhet tė ketė ndikuar nė frenimin e politikės sė dėbimit masiv tė shqiptarėve nė ish Jugosllavi. Politika e asimilimit civilizues, sic quhet ky nė literaturė, zuri vendin nė diskurisin politik jugosllav. Dėbimi masiv u bė i fshehur nė periudha tė ndryshme kohore dhe ate vetėm gjatė sundimit tė ministrit tė brendshėm serb, Aleksander Rankoviq.  
Ky lloj i politikės asimiluese ka qenė aq shumė i pėrsosur sa as sot e kėasj dite nuk ka ndonjė studim serioz ndėr ne rreth kėsaj ceshtje. Sot pėr sot mė shumė dihet pėr anėn e dhunshme dhe gjenocidale tė politikės serbe, kurse pėr anėn e asmilimit tė qetė dhe, sic quhet jasht, civlizues flitet fare pak ose aspak. Marrėveshja e Lozanės (1923) ka shėnuar fazėn e parė, nė plain ndėrkombėtarė, tė kėtij procesi tė asimilimit tė lejuar ndėrkombėtarisht. Ky proces mė vonė ėshtė quajtur „pastrim human etnik“ dhe ka pėrfshirė edhe legalizimin e metodave „civilizuese“ tė asimilimit tė cilat nė ndėrkohė u pranuan si qasje krejt normale ndaj minoriteteve etnike dhe tjera. Kjo, pas Luftės sė Dytė, u reflektua edhe ndaj shqiptarėve nė ish Jugosllavi. Dhe, jo vetėm vetėm kaq.  
Nė kuadėr tė kopjimit tė metodologjisė evropiane tė asimilimit, serbėt kanė zbatuar ndaj shqiptarėve tė njejta mjete dhe metoda si evropianėt por duke bėrė disa pėshtatje. Nė kėtė kontekst, serbėt kanė synuar fortė nė paraqitjen e shqiptarėve tė ish Jugolavisė si "shiptari", pėr ti dalluar kėshtu nga shqiptarėt e Shtetit shqiptar. Mė vonė, kjo ka qenė dashur tė jetė e pėrcjellur me ndryshimin e simboleve nacionale tė shqiptarėve nė rajon. Ky diskurs dhe kjo politikė ka qenė e ndjekur nė mėnyrėn me konzistente dhe mė brutale nga A. Rankoviqit. Meqė Rankoviqi pat rėnė shpejt nga pushteti, atherė edhe kjo politiklė ėshtė ndėrprerė dhe nuk ka pasur mundėsi vazhdimi nga tjerėt pėr forcė rrathanash, tė krijauara nė ish Jugosllavi nė mesin e viteve “60 tė sehkullit tė kaluar. Qasja ndaj shiqptarėve, rrjedhimisht, ka ndryshuar ashtu qė vėmendja tani qe bartur nė terrnin adminsitrativo-politik.   
Shqiptarėve iu njoh e drejta pėr zhvillim kulturur e politik, por jo shtetėrorė. Krejt sipas diskurisit dhe praktikės sovjektike tė kohės mbi zhvillimin e tė a.q. autonomive politiko-territoriale, tė zbuluara me tė vetmin qėllim tė mohimit tė ekzsitimit tė kombeve tė vjetra qė kanė jetuar nė territorin e ish Bashkimit Sovjetik. Shqiptarėt nė tė njejtėn kohė kėrkuan avancimin e statusit tė tyre juridik, kushtetues dhe politik, qė nėnkuptonte synimin e vendosur tė tyre pėr themelimin edhe tė "njė Shteti tjetėr shqiptar" nė rajon. Herė-hėrė, kėto synime nuk kanė qenė edhe aq serioze dhe tė parashtruara me vendosmėri.  
Nė momentin kur shqiptarėt parashtruan seriozisht kėrkesat pėr shtet tė tyre nė ish Jugosllavi, pas rėnies sė A. Rankoviqit, atherė u pėrdorėn kundėrargumentet krejt tė njohura dhe banale pėr sa i takon mungesės sė simboleve tė dallueshme prej Shtetit shqiptar, si parakusht pėr formimin e „Shtetit tė dytė shqiptar nė Ballkan“. Pėrjashtim nga kjo ėshtė koha kur Kosova dhe shqiptarėt ishin tejet tė dobėt nė vigjilje tė shpėrbėrjes sė ish Jugollavisė, ashtu qė edhe u arrit impoinimi i flamurit mė yllin proletar nė cep. Ky ndėrrim i flamurit shqiptar nuk ka shėnuar fazėn e fitimit tė shtetėsisė sė shqiptarėve nėn ish Jugosllavi, por tė rrėnimit total tė asaj autonomie tė Kosovės dhe tė shqiptarėve pa asnėj kompenzim. Tek e fundit kjo nuk conte shumė peshė tani sepse edhe vetė shteti i fundit i sllavėve tė jugut po rrėnohej gradualisht.  



Simbolet nuk kanė lidhje mė krijimin e shtetit  
Sikundėr vėrehet, dallimi qėndron vetėm nė argumentim. Kjo ėshtė shumė naive dhe e paqėndrueshme. Pėr dallim nga liderėt e fundit tė K;osovės komuniste, sot agrumentimi ėshtė fare i thjeshtė dhe ka njė apel shumė mė bindės tė dhe ėshtė mė imponues pėr qytetarin i zakonshėm tė Kosovės: Ne duhet tė ndėrrojmė simbolet tona, po na thonė liderėt tanė, sepse vetėm kėshtu bashkėsia ndėrkombėtare na pranon si shtet.  
As nė teori e as nė praktikėn e formimit tė shteteve nuk ekziston kriteri i ndrrimit tė simbolve pėr t'u bėrė shtet. Kėtyre ditėve tė mesit tė dhjetorit tė vitit 2002 dėgjova dikend qė thotė se dilema tė ngjashme me ne kanė pasur britanezėt, italianėt, gjermanėt, austriakėt, e kėshtu me radhė. Fitova pėrshtypjen se tėrė historia e Evropės paskėsh qenė histori e ndėrrimit tė simboleve. Kjo, megjithatė, nuk ėshtė kėshtu.  
Vėtėm katėr gjėra kėrkohen pėr tė qenė shtet sipas tė drejtės sė sotme ndėrkombėtare. Kėto kushte janė tė parashikuara nė Konventėn e Montevideos mbi tė Drejtat dhe Detyrat e Shteteve. Ato janė : 1) pasja e njė popullėsie; 2) njė terriori; 2) njė qeverie nėn kontrol efektiv tė kėsaj popullėsie dhe kėtij territori; dhe, sė fundi, 4) aftėsia e hyrjes nė marrdhėnie me shtetet tjera dhe organizatat ndėrkombėtare. Njohja e shtetit, i cili ka plotėsuar kėto kushte, ka vetėm karakterin deklarativ, pra tė konstatimit se njė entitet i dhėnė i ka plotėsuar kushtet pėr sa mė sipėr pėr tė qenė shtet. Asgjė mė shumė se kaq.  


Kėshtu ka ndodhė me tė gjitha ish republikat jugosllave, pėrfshirfė edhe IRJ tė Maqedonisė, tė cilės iu vu si kusht pėr njohje ndėrkombėtare ndėrrimi i emėrit tė saj kushtetues dhe i flamurit tė saj zyrtar. Kjo don tė thotė se Evropa dhe Bota e kanė konsidruar dhe akoma e konsiderojnė IRJ tė Maqedonisė, qė prej shtatorit 1991, si njė shtet sovran. Ndėrrimi i flamurit tanimė ėshtė kyrer, kurse emėri aktual duhet tė bėhet nė vitett qė vijnė, sipas kėkresės greke. Asgjė tė keqe kėtu nuk ka. Kėtė kėrkesė greke e kanė pranuar tėrė bashkėsia ndėrkombėtare. Fjala ėshtė jo pėr kushtin i cili shkakton krijimin e shtetit tė ri, por pėr njė mosmarrėveshje ndėrkombėtare nė mes dy shteteve sovrane, greqise dhe IRJ tė Maqedonisė.  
Nė vijim pėr sa mė sipėr, menjėherė shtrohet pyetja se kush dhe pse inicohet tani kjo cėshtje? Pra, shtrohet cėshtja e legjitimitetit tė patraqitėsi te tė kėrkesės, sikundėr do tė thoshte Maks Veberi. Nė rend tė parė duhet tė theksjojmė fuqishėm se asnjė dispozitė e Kornizės Kushtetuese nuk flet pėr tė drejktėn e Kyretarit tė Kosovbės, ose tė cilitdo prej organeve tė Kosovės, pėr t'u marr ėme ndėrrim simbolesh dhe tė ngjashme. Nė rend tė dy, ngaana morale, nuk besoj se kushdo nė Kosovė ka tė drejtėn e vetme morale pėr tė inicuar ndėrrimin e simboleve tė cilat i takojnė shkeujve dhe gjeneravtav qė nuk mbahen mend. Kėtu nuk ėshtė me rėndėsi mėnry e fitimit tė kėtyre siumboleve, me luftė ose pa te. Me rėndėsi ėshtė se u takojnė shekujve dhe tėrė kombit shqiptarė. Kjo mė bėnė tė them se ėshtė krejt jolegjitim debati aktual pėr ndėrrimin e simboleve tona nacionale, me fokusim, tani pėr tani, nė flamurin kombetayr.  
Dikush tha se ky debat, hė pėr hė, nuk e ka kohėn. Nuk mendoj se ndėrrimi i simboleve nacionale ka ndonjė kohė tė pėrshtatshme sepse askush nuk mban mend qė tė ekzistojė ndonjė datė e lėnė amanet nga dikush e qė tregon se kur duhet tė fillohet me ndėrrimin e simboleve tonancionale. Kjo ka lidhje vetėm me faktin se ndėrrimi i tyre, ėshtė shumė e sigurtė, nuk sjellė shtetin e Kosovės. A ka argument mė tė madhė se nėnshkrimi i Kartės Kushtetuėse nė mes tė Serbise dhe Malit tė Zi, vetėm pak ditė me parė.  



Cka pėr fund?
Si ėshtė qenia njerėzore, thash me vete kėtyre ditėve, duke kujtuar Kunderėn dhe "Lehtėsinė e Paduerueshme tė Ekzistimit". Sikur dikush nga kėta qė sot kanė filluar dhe janė zhytur nė debatin rreth ndėrrimit tė simboleve tona nacionale tė kishte ditur se njė ditė vetė do tė pranonin ndėrrimin e simboleve nacionale, qoftė edhe pėr hirė tė bashkimit nacional, kurrė nuk do tė kishin besuar. Bile-bile, besoj shumė, pėrhapėsin e njė ideje tė tillė do ta kishin fyer mė sė rėndi qė ėshtė e mundur. Ndoshta do ta kishin rrezikuar edhe integritietin e tij fizik. Nė fakt, kėtė fat e ka pasur ish lideri i fundit komunist i Kosovės, z. Azem Vllasi, kur provoi tė futej nė njė lojė tė tillė tė krijimit tė njė flamuri tjetėr shqiptar me "yllin pesrremėsh nė cep". Shumė interesant, apo jo? Ideja dhe synimi, pra, mbeten tė njejėt: krijim i njė "tjetėr identiteti shqiptar jasht kufijve tė Shtetit shqiptar". Dicka, megjithatė, ndryshon. Cka tjetėr pos arysetimit para opinionit publik, pėrkatėsisht para qytetarėve tė cilėt goditetn me kėtė ndėrrim.   
Ėshtė e qartė se ky ndėrrim do tė pasojė pashmangėsisht, por jo ashtu si mendon z. Rugova, si kryetar Kosove dhe si inicues i kėsaj ideje. Nuk mund tė dihet me saktėsi se ēfarė do tė jetė pamja e flamurit tonė nacional. Mirėpo, ėshtė shumė e qartė se ai do tė ketė njė simbolė krejt tjetėr, i cili nuk do tė reflektojė aspiratat dhe ndjenjat nacionale tė qytetarėve shumicė, pra tė shqiptarėve. Kjo ėshtė pėr faktin se ai flamur dhe krjet simbolet e ardhshme tė Kosovės duhet tė reflektojnė pikėrisht tė kundėrtėn e asaj qė thonė liderėt tanė sot: Kosovėn si njė etnitet, pėrkatėsisht si pjesė tė pandarė tė Unionit Serbi dhe maili i Zi, i cili ėshtė nė formim e sipėr qė nga marsi i vitit 2002.   
Kjo, pra jo njohja dhe formi i shtetit tė Kosovės, janė arsyeja thelbėsore pėr nxitjen ndėrkombėtare pėr fillimin e debatit aktual pėr ndėrrim tė simboleve tona kombėtare, tė cilat, ashtu si ajnė sot, nga pikėpamja e tė drejtės ndėrkombėtare, mund tė paraqesin pengesė pėr futjen e Kosovės nė njė shtet tė pėrbashkėt, tė quajtur Unioni Serbi dhe Maili i Zi, "me simbolet e njė shteti fqinjė", pra tė Shtetit shqiptar.  
Entiteti i ri shtetėrore serbo-malazez duhet ėt reflektojė nė tėrsi nga pikėmapja ndėrkombėtare pamjen dhe simbolet e brendshme tė entiteteve pėrbėrėse, pra jo tė shtetėve tjera sovrane. Kjo ėshtė aryseja qė tjerėt kėrkojėsn nga ne ndėsrrimin e simboleve dhe jo krijimi apo njohja ndėrkombėtare e shtetit tė Kosovės.   
Nėse e "E Drejta Ndėrkombėtare", sic po thuhet, kėrkon nga ne si Kosovė qė tė ndryshojmė simbolet tona, atherė kjo nuk ka tė bejė aspak me pavarėsinė e Kosovės por me tė kundėrtėn e saj: krijimin e parakushteve bazė pėr reintegrim gradual tėe Kosovės nė Serbi, tani nėn maskėn e njė lidhjeje tė cthurur dhe asimetrike shtetėrore, tė njohur tanimė si Unioni Serbi dhe Mali i Zi.  
Debatet si ky pėr ndėrrim tė simboleve nacionale vihen nė lėvizje mė vėshtirėsi. Por, kur vihen, nuk kontrollohen nga ata qė kanė qenė akter kryesor tė lojės, pra inicues tė debateve tė tilla. Derisa bashkėsia ndėrkombėtare kėrkon legjitimimin e kėtij procesi vetėm nė fillimin e tij, e njejta bashkėsi do tė jetė arrogante dhe e pamėshrishme nė imponim tė simboleve tjera pasi tė ketė filluar ky proces. Kėtė e ka dėshmuar mė sė miri rasti i Bosnje-Hercegovines.  
Me aktin e inicimit tė kėtij debati nė Kosovė rreth ndėrrimit tė simboleve tona nacionale, z. Rugova, si kryetar Kosove, por edhe tė gjitha ata qė mendojnė se kjo sjell pavarėsinė, vetėm sa marrin pėrgjegjėsi pėr imponim tė njė identiteti tė ri Kosovės dhe qytetarėve tė saj shumicė, identitet i cili nuk do tė ketė asgjė tė pėrbashkėt me Kosovėn si Dardani, pra me Kosovėn historike. Fillet e zėnies rrėnjė sė kėtij identiteti tė ri, ne si gjeneratė do tė kemi rastin t'i shohim hiq mė larg se pėr dy dekadat nė vijim.  
(Botuar nė tė pėrmuajshmen "Ekskluzive", dhjetor 2002)



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Bota para dhe pas 24 marsit ‘99


Aleanca simbolike


Evropa si sistem sigurie u tregua e paqenė, pa elementin e NATO-s dhe komponentin e fortė amerikan. Bosnja-Hercegovina u bė metaforė e kėsaj.


Prof. dr. Enver HASANI


Rishikimi i intervenimit tė NATO-s nė Kosovė mė 1999 doemos nxjerr nė pah gjenezėn e krizės dhe luftės nė ish-Jugosllavi. Winston Churchill citohet tė ketė se ndėr gabimet kryesore tė perėndimorėve gjatė shekullit njėzetė ka qenė - nė mes tjerash - rrėnimi i Perandorisė sė ndritur Austro-Hungareze dhe krijimi nė gėrmadhat e saj i shteteve tė prapambetura dhe tė pavlera si ish-Jugosllavia. Ai shtet, megjithatė, arriti ta luaj njė rol relativisht tė rėndėsishėm, njėherė si “cordone sanitaire” karshi depėrtimit sovjetik poshtė nė Evropė, e pastaj si njė “buffer zone” nė mes tė Lindjes e Perėndimit gjatė Luftės sė Ftoftė. Prishja e parametrave gjeostrategjike - pas vitit 1990 - tė cilėt kishin ēuar nė krijimin e atij shteti, riktheu edhe njėherė mundėsinė qė Perėndimi t’i pėrmirėsojė gabimet e fillimit tė shekullit njėzetė.


Ndėrhyrja amerikane...


Roli i Perėndimit ndaj gjenocidit qė serbėt e kryen ndaj tjerėve, ndaj politikės e iluzioneve serbe tė tyre pėr sundim pa kufi mbi tjerėt, janė cilėsitė kryesore tė krizės dhe tragjedisė ish-jugosllave. Evropa e kohės sė shpėrbėrjes sė ish-Jugolsllavisė nuk ka qenė e njėjtė me kohėn e ndėrmjet dy luftėtare botėrore, e aq mė pak me kohėn e perandoreshės Maria Teresa (ose me cilėn do kohė tė ideatorėve tjerė tė ndritur tė Evropės sė Perandorit Charlemagne). Evropa e kėsaj kohe pati nė krye tė saj njerėz qė vajtonin pėr fronet e Selanikut, siē ishte i ndjeri presidenti francez Franēois Mitterrand, ose njė grupim tjetėr politikanėsh joserioz, tė papėrgjegjshėm dhe tė pavetėdijshėm pėr fazėn nė tė cilėn po futej Evropa pas mbylljes sė Luftės sė Ftoftė (siē ishte rasti me ish-ministrin e Jashtėm italian, Gianni de Michelis). Thėnė shkurt, Evropa ishte nė njė amulli dhe nuk dinte se nga t’ia mbajė nė vakumin dhe tranzicionin gjeostrategjik qė lihej prapa rrėnimit tė Murit tė Berlinit. Askush mė mirė se Bosnje-Hercegovina nuk e ka provuar kėtė fazė tė zymtė tė politikės evropiane. Dominimi i klisheve tė vjetra tė rivaliteteve evropiane, paragjykimet e hapura ndaj rolit tė myslimanėve tė Evropės nė arkitekturėn e re tė sigurisė evropiane - e cila po krijohej ngadalė - si dhe fobia nga ndikimi amerikan nė kontinent kanė qenė faktorėt kryesor qė kanė shkaktuar mosveprimin e evropianėve nė Bosnje-Hercegovinė dhe tolerimin e gjenocidit atje. U dashtėn muaj e vite pėr tė parė tėrė rezultatin tragjik tė kėsaj politike tė ēoroditur evropiane. Ēmimi human, megjithatė, qe tepėr i lartė. Vetėm ndėrhyrja graduale amerikane nė ēėshtjet e sigurisė evropiane dhe pėrgjithėsisht nė punėt e kontinentit tė vjetėr - siē kishte ndodhur nė momentet kyēe gjatė Luftės sė Parė, tė Dytė dhe Luftės sė Ftohėt - bėri qė serbėt tė kuptojnė ngadalė se NATO mund tė ketė edhe rol shtesė, jo vetėm mbrojtės - siē kishin mėsuar nėpėr shkolla e akademi tė ish-Jugosllavisė.


Pak kush nga serbėt ka besuar nė fillim se NATO mund tė jetė zėvendėsim i asaj force ushtarake dhe tė sigurisė e cila qe parashikuar nga hartuesit e Kartės sė OKB-sė nė mbarim tė Luftės sė Dytė Botėrore. Fillimisht sulmi ajror ndaj pozicioneve serbe, mė pastaj mbrojtja e myslimanėve boshnjak, tolerimi i armatosjes sė tyre karshi serbėve dhe inkurajimi i aleancave tė tyre me kroatėt kundėr serbėve, kanė qenė hapat e ngadalshėm por tė sigurt qė hapėn rrugėn drejt involvimit tė NATO-s nė krizėn ish-jugosllave dhe bėrjen e saj partner tė pashmangshėm dhe faktorin kyē nė paqen dhe stabilitietin e Evropės sė sotme.


Ngjashėm ndodhi edhe me rolin e UĒK-sė gjatė viteve 1998-1999.


Cinikėt dhe ata qė janė pro teorive tė konspiracionit do tė thonin se amerikanėt mė qellim kanė toleruar luftėrat e tragjeditė nė territorin ish-jugosllav pėr t’i mundėsuar NATO-s njė rol tė ri. Por, kjo nuk ėshtė kėshtu. Politika sterile evropiane dhe paaftėsia e saj pėr t’i zgjedhur problemet etnike dhe konfliktet e armatosura - si njė lloj i ri i rrezikut pėr sigurinė evropiane - kanė qenė dhe janė faktori kyē qė ka nxitur involvimin e NATO-s pas viti 1990.


Kosova dhe NATO


Evropa si sistem sigurie u tregua e paqenė, pa elementin e NATO-s dhe komponentin e fortė amerikan. Bosnja-Hercegovina u bė metaforė e kėsaj. Regjimi i Milosheviqit po vinte sėrish nė sprovė kėtė pasiguri evropiane. Derisa pėr evropianėt - qė nuk pretendonin njė rol global nė politikėn ndėrkombėtare - kjo ishte fare normale, pėr amerikanėt tolerimi i njė aventure tė re tė Milosheviqit nė Kosovė paraqitej si luks i vėrtetė.


Administrata e presidentit Clinton kishte investuar shumė nė paqen nė Lindjen e Mesme (Marrėveshjet e Oslos mė 1993) dhe ishte pėr njė polikė tė jashtme, mė tolerante, ndaj islamit politik. Kapitali i fituar nė Bosnje dhe Hercegovinė qartė tregonte pėr njė administratė tė orientuar kah partneriteti me regjimet dhe popujt e vendeve islamike nė rendin e ri qė po krijohej. Kosova paraqiste njė shans tjetėr pėr Milosheviqin pėr tė vėnė nė sprovė unitetin evro-atlantik, i bindur se interesimi regjional evropian do tė binte ndesh me politikėn globale amerikane tė promovimit tė interesave nacionale - siē ndodhė zakonisht me fuqitė kolosale me pretendime pėr tė bėrė ligjin ndėrkombėtar nė pėrmasa botėrore. Tolerimi edhe i njė Bosnje tjetėr, pėr marrėdhėniet e evro-perėndimore me botėn islame - nė veēanti i marrėdhėnieve amerikane mė kėto vende dhe popuj - kishte kaluar ēdo kufi dhe po jepte shenjat e njė luftė tė re kryqėzatash. Sė paku kėshtu perceptohej dhe shihej nė sytė e mendjet e vendeve dhe popujve islamik. 


Doktrina e “dėmit zero”


Sigurisht qė doktrina Powell, ose doktrina e “dėmit zero”, e cila ėshtė zbatuar nė Kosovė, paraqet njė doktrinė qė matet me shume faktor dhe mbėshtet nė shumėsi rrethanat tė cilat i kanė diktuar premisat e saj themelore. Tė thuash se amerikanet nė parim kanė dėshire tė fitojnė dhe realizojnė interesat e tyre nacionale pa asnjė humbje dhe nė ēdo rast, kjo ėshtė mė shume se naive dhe mosnjohje e sistemit politik amerikan dhe vetė politikes sė saj tė jashtme (mėnyrės se si formohet dhe ekzekutohet ajo politikė). Nė kėtė kontekst duhet tė shikohet edhe doktrina e Powell-it.


Kosova dhe intervenimi i NATO-s mė 1999 kanė ndodhur nė njė Ballkan ku rreziku pėr humbje ka qenė i vogėl, nė njė kohė kur NATO duhej tė jepte njė provim serioz pas gjysmė shekulli tė ekzistencės sė vet. Komprometimi i evropianėve nė Bosnje-Hercegovinė, diskreditimi i Milosheviqit dhe i ēdo sistemi ndėrkombėtare tė sigurisė nga ana e tij (i OKB-sė nė rend tė parė), interesi jetik amerikan pėr mbajtjen e marrėdhėnieve tė mira me vendet myslimane pas vitit 1993 dhe stabilizimi i ēėshtjes palestineze, kanė qenė faktorėt kryesor qė ēuan nė ndėrhyrjen e NATO-s nė Kosovė.


Kosova ishte vendi mė i pėrshtatshėm pėr rritjen e kapitalit politik amerikan me njė mund tė vogėl, krahasuar me fuqinė e tyre kolosale. Ky kapital mė pastaj ka mundur tė pėrdorej me sukses nė arritjen e paqes nė Lindje tė Mesme dhe nė krijimin e aleatėve stabil nė atė pjesė tė botės - kaq jetike pėr interesin nacional amerikan. Vėnia nė lėvizje e NATO-s pa amerikanėt nuk ka asnjė kuptim dhe kjo vėnie nė lėvizje shpjegohet vetėm me faktorėt e sipėrpėrmendur e assesi ndryshe. Mbi bazėn e kėtij shpjegimi, rasti i Kosovės nuk mund tė shikohet si njė precedent qė vlen pėr vendet dhe herėt tjera, sado qė nė pikėpamje psikologjike ka dhėnė mesazhe tė frikshme pėr kundėrshtarėt potencial tė interesave nacionale amerikane, nė rend tė parė tė rusėve, tė cilėt me fillimin e lutės nė Ēeēeni - menjėherė pas mbarimit tė luftės nė Kosovė - synuan relativizmin dhe mėnjanimin e pasojave tė dėmshme qė ndėrhyrja e NATO-s nė Kosovė krijoi pėr ta. Me ndėrhyrjen nė Ēeēeni, rusėt nė fakt vetėm pėrshpejtuan largimin e tyre nga skena politike e Ballkanit, duke u rikthyer sėrish - nė ndėrkohė - por jo pėrmes Kosovės ose Ēeēenisė, por pėrmes rolit tė tyre konstruktiv karshi lėvizjeve radikale islame nė Azinė Qendrore, pas tragjedisė sė 11 shtatorit 2001.



11 shtatori dhe ne


Tragjedia e 11 shtatorit sigurisht qė ka ndryshuar nė themel politikėn e jashtme amerikane dhe tė sigurisė, duke i bėrė mė tė qarta orientimet e administratave amerikane karshi rrezikut permanent ndaj interesave amerikane nė botė – terrorizimit ndėrkombėtar. I tillė ka qenė ky rrezik edhe mė herėt, por mė 11 shtator 2001 u demonstrua besueshmėria e atij rreziku, tė cilin e besonin vetėm komuniteti i ngushta i inteligjencės amerikane, ngjashėm siē pat ndodhur me evropianėt para marsit tė vitit 2004 (sulmet terroriste nė Madrid), tė cilėt po ashtu nuk besonin nė rrezikun nga islami radikal.


11 shtatori vuri nė lėvizje njė politikė tjetėr amerikanė tė sigurisė, e cila mė nuk matej me nivelin e humbjeve eventuale, por me arritjen e qėllimit final - bėrjen e Amerikės dhe tė amerikaneve mė tė sigurt, kudo nėpėr botė. Sa ėshtė arritur kjo, mbetet tė diskutohet njė herė tjetėr. Fakt ėshtė, megjithatė, se ndėrhyrja nė Afganistan pati sukses tė konsiderueshėm, forcoi marrėdhėniet transatlantike, dhe i dha Rusisė njė rol mė konstruktiv karshi perėndimit dhe NATO-s. Dallimet dhe problemet lindėn me Irakun, sepse ai u pa si njė interes ekskluziv amerikan nga ana e evropianėve, sado qė shikimi i afėrt i intervenimit tregon se pak dallim ka nė mes tij dhe qėllimit tė intervenimit nė Afganistan. Derisa nė Afganistan mbajtja nėn kontroll e lėvizjes radikale islamike u provua e vėshtirė dhe u bė vetėm prishja e celulave dhe e ēerdhes kryesore tė strehimit dhe shpėrndarja e grupeve radikale islamike, pa u rėnė prapa - siē kishin bėrė sovjetikėt dekada mė parė - nė Irak u arrit nxjerrja nė shesh e tė gjitha lėvizjeve radikale islamike, tė cilat luftėn nė kėtė vend e panė si njė shans pėr t’u hakmarrė ndaj amerikanėve dhe aleatėve tė tyre.


Evropianėt, megjithatė, nuk e shohin Irakun kėshtu. Sjelljet indiferente evropiane ndaj sigurisė amerikane dhe intervenimit ne Irak kanė pasur pėr pasojė ngritjen nė Amerikė tė njė lloj nacionalizmi ekonomik (Demokratėt) dhe politik (Republikanėt), i cili mund tė ketė pasoja tė paparashikueshme nė marrėdhėniet transatlantike. As sehiri i evropianeve ndaj Amerikės nė Irak, as nacionalizmi ekonomik e politik nė rritje ndėr amerikanėt, nuk ndihmojnė mbajtjen e kohezivitetit tė aleancės veriatlantike - NATO-s. Nuk ka asnjė dyshim se solidariteti i dy aneve tė Atlantikut ėshtė parakusht pėr tė penguar degjenerimin e luftės kundėr islamit radikal nė luftė civilizimesh, diēka qė do tė donin Bina Ladeni dhe pėrkrahėsit e tij. Kjo, nė fakt, do tė shėnonte atė qe John Mearsheimer e pat quajtur “Back to the Future”.


Kosova duhet, nė kėtė kontekst, tė jetė e vetėdijshme pėr rolin e saj, sado tė vogėl - por me simbolike tė madhe - nė kohėn qė po vjen. Ēdo moskujdes nė kėtė drejtim ndikon nė uljen e kapitalit tė fituar amerikan, nė vijim tė procesit tė shpėrbėrjes sė ish-Jugollavisė. Ky ėshtė vendi dhe roli i Kosovės si aleate dhe mike e SHBA-ve.



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